Inadequate control of chemical hazards cont'd - doe-hdbk-1139-1-2000

DOE-HDBK-1139/1-2000

Change Notice No. 1

A subcontractor employee was sprayed with acid when he inserted a hydrochloric acid pump into a

drum of sulfuric acid. When the two acids mixed, a violent chemical reaction caused acid to be

sprayed from the drum approximately 10 feet to the ceiling and onto the employee. (ORPS Report

ORO--MK-WSSRAP-1999-0004)

A technician working in a laboratory discovered a ruptured 1-liter polyethylene bottle of acid on the

floor of a chemical hood. Laboratory personnel had heated it to approximately 140 degrees, capped

it, and placed it in the hood to cool down. Chemists believe that off-gassing of the acid mixture at an

elevated temperature built up sufficient pressure to rupture the bottle. (ORPS Report SR--WSRC-

FSD-1998-0004)

Hazardous waste workers discovered a ruptured 1-liter glass bottle labeled "Used Nitric Acid" in a

waste room. Investigators determined that the unvented bottle had accumulated pressure over time,

causing it to burst. (ORPS Report CH-BH-BNL-NSLS-1996-0002)

A building was evacuated due to fumes generated by mixing a solution of nitric acid, hydrogen

fluoride, and acetic acid with a solution of ethanol, hydrofluoric acid, and water. Investigators

determined that the fumes resulted from a reaction between incompatible materials being mixed for

waste disposal by a technician. (ORPS Report SAN--LLNL-LLNL-1997-0037)

A researcher was adding methanol to two vials containing sodium permanganate and polychlorinated

biphenyls when an unexpected energetic reaction caused the mixture to spray from the vials and onto

the researcher's gloves. Investigators determined that there was an inadequate evaluation of chemical

compatibility. (ORPS Report ORO--ORNL-X10ENVIOSC-1996-0001)

Personnel who responded to a chemical spill of methyl acrylate were never briefed by facility

personnel. As a result, they did not assume command of the event, even though facility procedures

require the command to be transferred to Emergency Management and Response (EM&R) if the

facility does not have adequate resources to handle an event. The fact that the facility called for the

hazardous materials (HAZMAT) team and used the services of occupational medicine was a sign that

it did not have the necessary personnel to deal with the event, so EM&R should have assumed the

role of incident commander. Furthermore, no one was concerned about the flammability of the

chemical. No one called the fire department to respond as a precautionary measure. If the methyl

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