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Interviews Conducted - doe-hdbk-3012-20030045
Guide to Good Practices for Operational Readiness Reviews - index
Shift Performance

These control panel labels did match the Denitrator High Temperature Interlock Procedure. Air supplies to
XXX Wet Chemistry processes were appropriately graded and maintained. Grading boundaries were
mostly, but not always, noted on PSDs. Controlled copies of PSDs and Process Descriptions (PDs) are
currently not kept in the process areas. All system drawings that were sampled were found to be updated
and to identify system boundaries.
The PDs for the OXD, PE, IE, SE, WFE, and DNT systems were reviewed. Good consistency was noted
between the PSDs, the PDs, and the process descriptions in the BIO. Process boundaries are identified, but
many still do not comply with the guidance in Appendix E of XX-0011INS. While compliance with this
guidance should be improved, it is not a significant issue as there is some justification for the exceptions.
Description of isolation points from out-of-service equipment should be improved in some cases (PX
system particularly noted) (CM-1-1). The PDs have developed enough to be excellent training aids, but
could be more useful as configuration control documents if more design basis information (including
safety basis information) were included. DOE-STD-3024, System Design Descriptions, though not directly
applicable to PDs, could provide useful guidance for further development of the PDs.
Six Change Request Packages were reviewed. All records indicated that changes have been executed in
accordance with the site change control procedure. USQD packages associated with these and other
changes were reviewed. Differences were noted between the execution of the USQD process and the
intent of 10 CFR 830.203 and its guidance (CM-1-2). USQD Screen B1W-2003-002 was reviewed and
found to identify the wrong system as the subject of the change, to screen out a change that might have
needed to go to NNSA for approval, and to identify the wrong USQD worksheet number on its
continuation pages. No essential in-progress modifications were noted.
USQD B1W-99-003 was reviewed. This was a positive USQD resulting from a "discovery condition."
Notifications related to this USQD were made to NNSA via Occurrence Report ORO-XXX-XNUCLEAR-
1998-0094. Based upon records contained in the Occurrence Report, the appropriate steps were followed
notifying NNSA of the change.
Records for temporary modifications were reviewed and were found to be up-to-date with required actions
Interviews: System Engineers and the Restart System Engineering Supervisor were interviewed and MEL
and Grading Work Sheet Packages were reviewed in order to determine if XXX Wet Chemistry SSCs have
been graded and maintained on MELs, and properly labeled. Each SSC is graded based on function and
functional requirements (safety features), and related source documents (e.g. Criticality Safety
Evaluations). An SSC grade of 1-4 is assigned. The grading is documented on grading work sheets. With
the exception noted below, XXX Wet Chemistry SSCs have been graded per Y15-001 INS, documented
and maintained on MELs, and labeled in accordance with Y10-176. An exception was noted that software
components of systems were not graded per Y15-001INS (CM-1-3). As a result, changes to software may
not be appropriately controlled, and may fail to enter the USQ process. Based on the definition of SSC in
Y15-001INS, software is considered a "component" and thus requires grading and inclusion in the
Integrated Safety and Change Control Process.
System Engineers, the Restart System Engineering Supervisor, the Technical Support Manager, the XXX
Configuration Management Manager, an ET&I Electrician, and a Facility Technical Support
Representative were interviewed about their configuration management roles, responsibilities, and
interfaces. All were knowledgeable of and concerned with their assigned systems and responsibilities.
System engineers understood the safety-related design features and functions of their systems. As the
central point for complete knowledge and understanding of their systems, the system engineers could

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