emergency personnel and equipment in the event of a radiological emergency and
to allow for access by repair/corrective action teams.
Equipment should be available to allow for an early and reliable determination of
the seriousness of an accident or abnormal event. Depending upon the consequence
of potential accidents, consideration should be given to relaying all such equipment
alarms to a central control system or a continuously manned area. Installed on-line
equipment should be protected to the extent necessary to ensure its reliability under
accident conditions. To further enhance equipment reliability, the emergency
equipment should, to the extent practicable, be the same equipment used for routine
Emergency-power requirements that need to be satisfied and the means to provide
the power should be identified in the design effort.
Emergency radiological equipment should be installed or located in areas that
permit periodic inspection, testing, calibration, and maintenance.
Additional emergency-preparedness guidance is provided in Section 9.0.
The confinement system is a series of physical barriers that, together with a
ventilation system, minimizes the potential for release of radioactive material into
work areas and the environment under normal and abnormal conditions. The
primary design objective for the confinement system should be to minimize
exposure of the public and plant personnel to airborne contamination. Plutonium
should be separated from the ambient environment by at least two barriers and
from an operator by at least one barrier.
Primary confinement refers to the barrier that is or can be directly exposed to
plutonium, e.g., sealed process equipment (pipes, tanks, hoppers), glove boxes,
confinement boxes, open-faced hoods, conveyors, caissons, and cells and their
ventilation systems. The primary confinement barrier prevents the dispersion of
plutonium through either sealed construction or atmospheric pressure differential or
a combination of both. For example, process equipment that is not sealed but
contains plutonium material in process should be enclosed in glove boxes or other
confinement barriers. Fuel-rod cladding, bags, and other sealed containers can be
considered primary confinement. The chemical reactivity and the heat generation
effect of the plutonium compound should be considered when selecting primary
The primary confinement barrier protects operators from contamination under
normal operating conditions. This type of barrier is likely to be breached under
accident conditions (e.g., glove rupture, damaged seals, improper bag-out
operations, or leaks of flanged joints).
The primary confinement (with the exceptions of fuel rods, sealed sources, or
sealed cans) should be maintained at a negative air pressure with respect to the
secondary confinement in which it is located, and it should be exhausted through a
ventilation system that uses HEPA filters. The barrier and its accessory equipment