Quantcast Department of Energy Plutonium Vulnerability Analysis Study cont'd - doe-std-1128-98_ch10211

 

Click here to make tpub.com your Home Page

Page Title: Department of Energy Plutonium Vulnerability Analysis Study cont'd
Back | Up | Next

Click here for thousands of PDF manuals

Google


Web
www.tpub.com

Home

   
Information Categories
.... Administration
Advancement
Aerographer
Automotive
Aviation
Construction
Diving
Draftsman
Engineering
Electronics
Food and Cooking
Logistics
Math
Medical
Music
Nuclear Fundamentals
Photography
Religion
   
   

 

Share on Google+Share on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on TwitterShare on DiggShare on Stumble Upon
Back
Department of Energy Plutonium Vulnerability Analysis Study - doe-std-1128-98_ch10210
Up
DOE Standard Guide of Good Practices for Occupational Radiological Protection In Plutonium Facilities
Next
Waste Management - doe-std-1128-98_ch10213


DOE-STD-1128-98
Institutional vulnerabilities involve incomplete safety analyses, loss of experienced staff,
and operational problems such as a backlog of maintenance items on systems that are
important to safety.
The assessment found Rocky Flats Buildings 771 and 776 to be the most vulnerable
facilities, based on combinations of their vulnerabilities and amount of plutonium they
hold. These buildings are more than 35 years old and have design deficiencies. The next
group of most vulnerable facilities are the Savannah River Site's Building 235-F, FB-Line
and Old HB-Line; Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant; and Rocky Flats Building 779,
707, and 371. The material in these facilities includes plutonium solutions and reactive
materials.
This assessment provided the information base that will improve the Department's plan for
safely managing the future disposition of its plutonium. While most vulnerabilities were
already known, this assessment improved DOE's understanding of the issues. It has also
enabled the Department to document vulnerabilities, identify new ones and set priorities
which will establish a systematic approach to corrective action. DOE began formulating
corrective action plans to achieve safe and stable interim storage in September 1994.
The assessment reached several conclusions. Plutonium package failures and facility
degradation will increase in the future unless problems are addressed in an aggressive
manner. The Department needs a strong, centrally coordinated program to achieve safe
interim storage of plutonium. Priority must be given to plutonium solutions, chemically
reactive scrap/residues and packaging with plastics or other organic compounds. Much of
the Department's plutonium inventory, including plutonium in holdup, must be better
characterized and site-specific programs must be implemented to establish package design
lives. Management priorities at some site should be reassessed to provide proper attention
to those facilities identified as most vulnerable by this assessment. Sites must evaluate
institutional vulnerabilities such as the loss qualified staff, and compensate for them.
Standards or guidelines for packaging, storage and surveillance of plutonium scrap/residues
and solutions must be developed and implemented. Finally, the Department and its
stakeholders have just begun to work together to clean up the remnants of weapons
production processes.
7-19


Privacy Statement - Press Release - Copyright Information. - Contact Us

Integrated Publishing, Inc.