Detailed guidance on the implementation of the Order requirements has been
published by the DOE Office of Emergency Management (DOE, 1997). The
Emergency Management Guides (EMGs) have been published. The EMGs specify
acceptable methods of meeting the Order requirements. Individual guides have
been published for the hazards assessment process and for program elements.
SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FOR PLUTONIUM
This section provides technical guidance that is specifically applicable to the development
and implementation of emergency management programs for plutonium facilities. It is
intended to supplement, not replace, the more general recommendations provided in the
The emergency management hazards assessment for a facility that stores or
processes plutonium or its compounds should follow the basic assessment process
outlined in the DOE Emergency Management Guide, Guidance for Hazards
Assessment (DOE, 1992a). The Emergency Management Hazard Assessment
(EMHA) should be based upon the facility specific Safety Analysis Report (SAR),
which develops facility and operations hazards. Unique properties and
characteristics of plutonium and its compounds may need to be considered at
certain steps in the hazards assessment process.
(a) Description of Facility and Operations. The properties of the hazardous
material do not significantly affect the manner in which this step of the hazards
assessment is performed, except to the extent that plutonium safety
considerations may mandate more detailed descriptions of certain facility
physical or operational features.
(b) Identifying and Screening the Hazards. The objective of this step is to
identify hazards that are significant enough to warrant consideration in a
facility's emergency management program. It is recommended that screening
thresholds (or quantities) be selected for each hazardous material. This
screening threshold value is then compared to the inventories of the material at
risk of being released from a single event. If a particular inventory of material
is less than the screening threshold value, the consequences of its release are
presumed to be minimal. The potential release of that inventory need not be
The screening threshold value should be based on the dominant hazardous property
of a material. For all plutonium isotopes and all its chemical forms, radiotoxicity is
the property of most concern.