IV. LINKAGE TO THE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS
This section provides specific guidance on the linkage between the CSEs and the DSA. DOE's Nuclear
Safety Management Rule, 10 CFR 830 Subpart B, requires the preparation of safety bases, including
DSAs and TSRs, for Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities.
Chapter 6 of a DSA prepared according to DOE-STD-3009-94 contains a summary description of the
CSP, including a description of how CSEs are conducted. Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analysis, is
where the hazards are identified and analyzed, and controls are selected. CSEs provide detailed
information that should be reviewed when constructing DSA hazard analysis scenarios. However, while
such scenario entries in the hazard analysis may summarize CSE information, they are expected to be a
"stand-alone" product that does not incorporate CSEs into the DSA. The events identified in the hazard
analysis should be those covered in CSE. If the CSE shows that the fissionable material process/system
remains subcritical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions and documents that the
fissionable material process/system complies with the Double-Contingency Principle, then there is no
need to perform a separate analysis in the hazard analysis, only reference the CSE.
All controls necessary to prevent and/or mitigate criticality accidents shall12 be considered for inclusion in
the facility DSA and TSR. The CSP shall13 have a mechanism to review all changes or potential changes
to NCS controls for capture by the configuration control program as well as revisions and updates to the
DSA and TSRs.
A process to examine the collection of controls developed in the CSEs to determine their importance in
DSA space should be developed and documented as part of the CSP. The process should be agreed upon
by both the NCS and safety analysis staff and formally documented as part of the CSP description
document. It is important to note that not every CSE or fissionable material process is required to have a
control selected for inclusion in the DSA.
Eight evaluation criteria that should be used are listed below:
1. The selection of NCS controls for the DSA should be performed using a team of criticality safety,
nuclear safety, and operations personnel;