Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis cont'd

DOE-STD-3007-2007

2. The consequence of criticality should be examined for the purpose of establishing whether a

particular control is safety class or safety significant, equipment important to safety, or merely

provides defense in depth;

3. The CSEs that cover the fissionable material operations addressed by the DSA should be

examined to ensure that bounding assumptions or analysis conditions are considered as potential

DSA/TSR controls;

4. All passive engineered features credited in the CSE should be considered for selection as a DSA

design feature;

5. All active engineered features credited in the CSE should be considered for selection as a safety

class or safety significant Structures, Systems or Components (SSC) with associated safety limits

or limiting condition of operations as appropriate;

6. Not all engineered features (active or passive) need be selected for inclusion in the DSA/TSR.

The minimum set of controls selected for inclusion should be those that meet the following

conditions: (A) loss of the single control under consideration could directly result in a criticality

accident (such a system would require DOE approval according to 420.1B), (B) loss of the

control could result in a singly contingent condition, and (C) active controls requiring calibration.

Additional engineered features (active or passive) beyond the minimum set may be selected as

appropriate;

7. If all of the credible scenarios are shown to be subcritical by engineered features, then specific

administrative controls (see DOE-STD-1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls) are not

required; and/or

8. Only administrative controls meeting at least one of the following criteria should be considered

for inclusion: (A) credible violation of the control could directly lead to a criticality accident, (B)

if the safety function were to be equivalent to a safety class or safety significant engineered

control (as discussed in DOE-STD-1186-2004), and (C) general references to control philosophy

(e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for

the process without specific quantification of individual limits).