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Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis
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Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities
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Classification of Hazard Controls and Technical Safety Requirements


DOE-STD-3007-2007
2. The consequence of criticality should be examined for the purpose of establishing whether a
particular control is safety class or safety significant, equipment important to safety, or merely
provides defense in depth;
3. The CSEs that cover the fissionable material operations addressed by the DSA should be
examined to ensure that bounding assumptions or analysis conditions are considered as potential
DSA/TSR controls;
4. All passive engineered features credited in the CSE should be considered for selection as a DSA
design feature;
5. All active engineered features credited in the CSE should be considered for selection as a safety
class or safety significant Structures, Systems or Components (SSC) with associated safety limits
or limiting condition of operations as appropriate;
6. Not all engineered features (active or passive) need be selected for inclusion in the DSA/TSR.
The minimum set of controls selected for inclusion should be those that meet the following
conditions: (A) loss of the single control under consideration could directly result in a criticality
accident (such a system would require DOE approval according to 420.1B), (B) loss of the
control could result in a singly contingent condition, and (C) active controls requiring calibration.
Additional engineered features (active or passive) beyond the minimum set may be selected as
appropriate;
7. If all of the credible scenarios are shown to be subcritical by engineered features, then specific
administrative controls (see DOE-STD-1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls) are not
required; and/or
8. Only administrative controls meeting at least one of the following criteria should be considered
for inclusion: (A) credible violation of the control could directly lead to a criticality accident, (B)
if the safety function were to be equivalent to a safety class or safety significant engineered
control (as discussed in DOE-STD-1186-2004), and (C) general references to control philosophy
(e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for
the process without specific quantification of individual limits).
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