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Application of the Graded Approach - doe-std-3009-94_cn3_3-30-060051
Preparation Guide for U
Content Guidance for Sections of Chapter 3

DOE-STD -3009-94
and/or fault trees form the bases for physical phenomena modeling and engineering
analysis. The level of analytical effort employed is primarily a function of magnitude of
hazard, but also takes into account system complexity, and the degree to which detailed
modeling can be meaningfully supported by system definition. For nonreactor nuclear
facilities, these considerations do not support a need for probabilistic/qualitative risk
assessment of overall facility operations. This Standard does not present an expectation of
or a requirement for probabilistic/qua litative risk assessment. Additionally, in accordance
with DOE-STD-1027, the hazard analysis as described in Section 3.3, "Hazard Analysis,"
of this Standard is sufficient to meet the 10 CFR 830 requirements of accident analysis for
Hazard Category 3 facilities. The hazard analysis should be adequate to provide a simple
estimate of bounding consequences for Hazard Category 3 facilities.
It must be kept in mind that Hazard Category 3 facilities may also have chemical hazards.
The hazard classification mec hanism used in DOE-STD-1027 does not consider the
potential hazardous chemical releases. The results of the hazard analysis will indicate
whether a facility contains significant chemical hazard(s) that may necessitate accident
Accident analysis is also inherently graded in terms of the degree of physical modeling and
engineering analysis needed to quantify accident consequences and likelihood. The use of
bounding assumptions and less detailed physical modeling in accident analysis is
appropriate. For example, where a given release has low consequences even if a filtered
ventilation system is bypassed, detailed modeling of filtered release parameters such as
filter differential pressure, plenum temperature, etc, is not needed for the given accide nt.
Formal, quantitative analysis of potential accident sequences as described in Section 3.4,
"Accident Analysis," is not required to assess worker safety issues in addition to the
hazard analysis. The largely qualitative hazard evaluation described in Section 3.3,
which is a thorough analysis of potential accidents, is a more relevant vehicle for worker
safety assurance.
Additional guidance on hazard and accident may be gained from the following
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, American Institute of Chemical
Engineers, 1992.
"Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with
DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports" DOE-STD-1027.
"Recommended Values and Technical Bases for Airborne Release Fractio ns
(ARFs), Airborne Release Rates (ARRs), and Respirable Fractions (RFs) at DOE
Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities" DOE Handbook (HDBK)-3010.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysts Handbook, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission NUREG-1320.
"A Strategy for Occupational Exposure Assessment," American Industrial
Hygienists Association, 1991.
"Application of Hazard Evaluation Techniques to the Degree of Potentially
Hazardous Industrial Chemical Processes," National Institute of Occupational
Page 27

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