This introduction addresses the following major topics related to implementing the
requirements of 10 CFR 830.
Purpose of DOE-STD-3009--Indicates scope and general applicability of
DSA Preparation Conceptual Basis and Process Ensures consistent and
appropriate treatment of all DSA requirements for the variety of DOE
nonreactor nuclear facilities.
Hazard Analysis --Provides final facility hazard categorization and considers
and incorporates into programmatic requirements measures to protect wo rkers,
the public, and the environment from hazardous and accident conditions.
Technical Safety Requirements and safety-significant structures, systems, and
components, that are major contributors to worker safety and defense in depth,
are identified in the hazard analysis.
Accident Analysis--Designates safety-class structures, systems, and
components and safety controls (i.e., TSRs) as a function of the Evaluation
Guideline (see Appendix A).
Application of the Graded Approach--Provides a consistent and meas ured
treatment of this concept, including guidance on the minimum acceptable DSA
PURPOSE OF D O E-STD -3 0 0 9
This Standard describes a DSA preparation method that is acceptable to the DOE as
delineated for those specific facilities listed in Table 2 of Appendix A, "General Statement
of Safety Basis Policy", to Subpart B, "Safety Basis Requirements", of 10 CFR 830. It
was developed to assist Hazard Category 2 and 3 facilities in preparing SARs that will
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 830. Hazard Category 1 facilities are typically
expected to be Category A reactors for which extensive precedents for SARs already exist.
Guidance provided by this Standard is generally applicable to any facility required to
document its safety basis in accordance with 10 CFR 830. For new facilities in which
conceptual design or construction activities are in progress [i.e., Preliminary Documented
Safety Analysis (PDSAs)] elements of this guidance may be more appropriately handled
as an integral part of the overall des ign requirements process (e.g., preliminary design to
design criteria). The methodology provided by this Standard focuses more on
characterizing facility safety (i.e., back-end approach) with or without well-documented
information than on the determinatio n of facility design (i.e., front end approach).
Accordingly, contractors for facilities that are documenting conceptual designs for PDSAs
should apply the process and format of this Standard to the extent it is judged to be of