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Page Title:
A Cable Tray Fire At A Commercial Nuclear Power Plant |
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|  DOE-HDBK-1116-98
APPENDIX B
T
his case study covers a cable tray fire at
allowing the plant to be brought to a stable
a commercial nuclear power plant. An
shutdown condition. There was no release
event description of operator actions
of radioactivity.
necessary to fight the fire and maintain
control of the plant is included.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT
T
Successfully extinguishing a fire is difficult
his commercial nuclear power plant is a
under ideal conditions; combining fire
three-unit boiling water reactor site. At
fighting efforts with a plant shutdown
the time of the event, Units 1 and 2 were in
requires forethought and planning.
operation at 100% power. Unit 3 was under
construction.
OVERVIEW
Activities Preceding the Fire
T
he commercial nuclear power plant
experienced a serious inplant cable tray
The plant is designed so the air movement
fire. The fire was started by an engineer
from one plant area to another is controlled
who was using a candle to check for air
by supply and exhaust fans and will always
leaks through a fire wall penetration seal.
be toward the area of possible higher
The fire spread and was fought on both
radiation. The reactor building and refueling
sides of the reactor building and cable
floor is the area of lowest pressure. The
spreading room wall by plant and local
standby gas-treatment system must exhaust
community fire fighting personnel. Efforts to
air from the reactor building to maintain a
put out the fire were made difficult by
negative pressure. In order not to exceed
several factors: delay in notifying personnel
the capacity of this system, inleakage to the
of the exact location of the fire, physical
reactor building must be kept at a minimum.
location of the fire in the cable trays, and the
high differential pressure between the cable
The refueling floor is common for all three
spreading room and the reactor building that
reactor units. To maintain the proper
resulted in high air flow rates through the
pressure conditions, an airtight partition was
wall.
constructed between operating Units 1 and
2, and Unit 3, while Unit 3 was under
The effects of the fire on the plant were
construction. It was necessary to determine
almost immediate. All Unit 1 emergency
that the standby gas-treatment system could
core cooling systems were lost, as well as
handle the added inleakage from the Unit 3
the capability to monitor core power. To
reactor building before the partition between
remove decay heat, low pressure water from
Units 2 and 3 could be removed. Leakage
the condensate pumps and manual
tests run on the Units 1 and 2 reactor
operation of primary relief valves were used
buildings indicated that leakage had to be
until normal decay heat removal systems
reduced to a maintaining inleakage within
could be made operational. Control power
the requirements of the Units 1 and 2
to motor operators and pump controls was
technical specifications when the partition
established using temporary jumpers
was removed.
B-5
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