To the extent practical, discrete processing steps should be performed in
individual process confinements to reduce the amount of hazardous
material that can be released by a single or local failure of the
confinement system. Process and auxiliary system differential pressure
should be maintained to inhibit back-flow of hazardous materials into
Process operations that involve oxide powder or that can generate
powder or dust should be provided with special confinement to prevent
the spread of contamination. Facility design should preclude the handling
of uranium oxides in large open rooms.
Airborne radioactive wastes typically associated with UPHFs that should
be considered during the design include but are not limited to airborne
particulate material generated by fabrication processes (e.g., airborne
grinding dust). Nuclear criticality safety should be considered in the
design of the airborne effluent system.
When inert confinement system atmospheres are used, moisture removal
systems should be considered to maintain long-term stability of packaged
material. Small-volume process enclosures should be designed to
prevent the enclosed atmosphere from being pressurized by rapid
insertion of gloves into the enclosure.
IRRADIATED FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE FACILITIES .
Introduction . IFMSFs are self-contained installations for storage of highly
radioactive fissile material (e.g., spent fuel and target elements) that has been
exposed to a neutron fluence, usually in a nuclear reactor. The irradiated
material should be properly clad or canned when received so that leakage from
the assemblies is minimized and remains within specified limits. The IFMSF
stores the material in a manner that ensures the integrity of the cladding or
canning. The stored material is shipped to facilities such as a hot laboratory or
high-level solid radioactive waste facility.