Overview of one methodology to integrate safety management into safety and fire hazard analysis documentation

DOE-HDBK-1163-2003

So why is it so often that -- in terms of fire hazards -- when one compares the safety analysis

documentation to the fire hazard analysis for the same facility; we often find dissimilar analyses,

different mitigation methods, and inconsistencies in the area of fire-related hazards? Perhaps the

answer is that the DOE objectives of the two are similar in some ways but different in other ways.

Are the analytical techniques, which are acceptable for the safety hazard analysis, not acceptable

for the fire hazard analysis? Could it be that the fire protection engineer just doesn't understand

the safety analyst or vice versa? DOE and its contractors possess a variety of processes for

analyzing fire hazards at a facility, activity, and job. The outcome and assumptions of these

processes have not always been consistent for similar types of hazards within the safety analysis

and the fire hazard analysis.

Perhaps the root cause lies in the fact that we have yet to embrace the challenge to integrate and

institutionalize work planning in the development of these two documents4. While the safety

analysis and the fire hazard analysis are driven by different DOE Orders and requirements, these

analyses should not be entirely independent and their preparation should be integrated to ensure

consistency of assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and other controls.

Under the DOE policy to implement an integrated safety management system, identification of

hazards must be evaluated and agreed upon to ensure that the environment, the public, and the

workers are protected from adverse consequences.5 The DOE program and contractor

management need a uniform, up-to-date reference with which to plan, budget, and manage

nuclear programs. It is crucial that the DOE understands the hazards and risks necessary to

authorize the work, which needs to be performed. If integrated safety management is not

incorporated into the preparation of the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis,

inconsistencies between assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and controls may

occur that affect safety. Furthermore, confusion created by inconsistencies may occur in the DOE

process to grant authorization of the work.

The Department of Energy is committed to conducting work efficiently and in a manner that

ensures protection of the environment, the public, and its workers. Hazards and safety functions

of both the safety and fire hazard analyses documentation should be consistent so that there is no

confusion to both contractor and DOE operations and management.

Take the integrated safety management system challenge and utilize integrated safety

management in the preparation of the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis.

Overview of one methodology to integrate safety management into safety and fire

hazard analysis documentation

In accordance with the integrated safety management system approach for having a uniform and

consistent process, a process has been suggested by the U.S. Department of Energy at Richland

and the Project Hanford Procedures for any case when fire hazard analyses and safety analyses

are required.6 This process provides for a common basis approach to develop both fire hazard

analyses and the safety analyses. This process permits the preparers of both documents to jointly

participate in the development of the hazard analysis process.

The process assists in ensuring that the accident analyses for fire and explosion events are

consistent in both the fire hazard analysis and facility safety documentation. In accordance with

the Integrated Safety Management System approach for having "similar and consistent processes

for dealing with different types of hazards" the following process is utilized to ensure

consistency:

B-4