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|  DOE-HDBK-1163-2003
1.
The fire hazard analysis author and the safety analyst jointly identify fire-related hazards
and evaluate the postulated fire scenario(s). At this stage, the hazardous conditions
evaluated must not reflect prevention or mitigation by engineered barriers, facility
systems, manual intervention, or administrative controls.
2.
All credible initiating events, which can cause one or more fires and define or influence
their characteristics and severity, are identified.
3.
The postulated fire(s) using the analytical methods selected are evaluated. It is
recognized that a variety of hazardous conditions may require evaluation to ensure that
all of the objectives of the DOE Orders are met.
4.
The safety analyst follows the criteria for the nuclear safety documentation to report the
risk to the health and safety of the public and onsite workers and to identify engineered
features and controls that prevent or mitigate the progression of the postulated fire
event(s).
5.
The fire hazard analysis uses the postulated fire(s) to identify fire protection design
features. The fire hazard analysis assesses the fire loss, identifies protection and life
safety features required in the facility, and addresses program interruption to the facility.
6.
The fire hazard analysis addresses the impact of fire and explosion on essential safety
functions as identified by the nuclear safety documentation. The fire hazard analysis
must consider protection of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to
safety and evaluate the need for fire separation of redundant SSCs.
7.
The final fire hazard analysis is referenced by the facility nuclear safety authorization
basis documentation, that is, either the final safety analysis report, basis for interim
operation report, or interim safety basis report.
References
1.
J. J., DiNunno, "Fundamentals for Understanding Standards-Based Safety Management
of Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities," Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, DNFSB/TECH-5, May 31, 1995.
2.
DOE 420.1, "Facility Safety," U.S. Department of Energy, October 13, 1995.
3.
DOE 5480.23, "Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports," U.S. Department of Energy, April 10,
1992.
4.
J. J., DiNunno, "Integrated Safety Management," Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, DNFSB/TECH-16, June 1997.
5.
DOE P 450.4, "Safety Management System Policy," U.S. Department of Energy, October
15, 1996.
6.
RLID 420.1, "Fire Protection," U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office,
March 1999.
B-5
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