Requirements Related to Analysis of Specific Types of Hazards

DOE-HDBK-1163-2003

3.2

Requirements Related to Analysis of Specific Types of Hazards

A second group of hazard analysis activities can be characterized as having in common a focus on

specific types of hazards or hazardous conditions. Hazard analyses that fall into this category

include the following:

Fire Hazards Analysis (DOE 420.1)

Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (DOE 420.1)

Natural Phenomena Hazards Assessment (DOE 420.1)

Various Hazard Specific Regulations (e.g., Beryllium Hazards Assessment (10 CFR 850),

OSHA regulations for asbestos and lead (1910.1001 and 1910.1025)

Since each of these analyses is focused on a generically different hazard, there is little apparent

overlap among requirements in this group. However, there are some basic links among these

hazard analysis activities that should be considered, as well as a need for integration with nuclear

safety analysis or PrHA activities.

Fire hazards analysis (FHA), is required for all nuclear facilities or facilities that present unique

or significant fire risks. This involves a comprehensive evaluation of fire hazards, including

postulation of fire accident scenarios and estimates of potential consequences (i.e., maximum

credible fire loss). DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety, requires that conclusions of the FHA be

integrated into safety analysis reports (or DSAs per 10 CFR830). The DOE Implementation

Guide G-420.1/B-0 (G-440.1/E-0) addresses this integration as follows:

"When both an FHA and a SAR are developed for a facility, the developmental effort

should be coordinated to the maximum extent possible to avoid duplication of effort. It is

recognized, however, that because an FHA is based on the premise that a fire will occur

and considers fire safety issues (property loss and program discontinuity potential) that are

not normally considered in the SAR, the conclusions of the FHA may be more conservative

than would normally be developed by a SAR alone. Nevertheless, the FHA and its

conclusions should be addressed in the facility SAR in such a manner as to reflect all

relevant fire safety objectives as defined in Paragraph 4.2.0.1 of DOE 420.1 and Section 2

of Attachment 1 of DOE 440.1."

Although not stated, this same principle would apply to PrHA efforts at non-nuclear hazardous

facilities that are subject to DOE 420.1.

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has noted several instances at DOE sites where

FHAs are inconsistent with accident assumptions found in nuclear safety analysis (e.g., fire

barriers were assumed in the safety analysis where they weren't present). FHAs should be

coordinated and integrated through teaming of fire safety personnel with hazard/accident

analysts, and any conflicts related to FHAs and DSAs should be resolved prior to the

approval of the DSA. A white paper on the topic of FHAs and safety analysis efforts has been

prepared by members of the DOE fire safety community, and is provided in Attachment 3.

Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations. DOE O 420.1 also requires a Nuclear Criticality Safety

Evaluation (NCSE). An NCSE is an evaluation focused on facility piping, vessels and design

features to identify the parameters, limits, and controls needed to prevent an inadvertent

criticality. While this activity is not duplicative of safety analysis efforts, coordination and