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DOE-HDBK-6004-99
Channel 2 Green
Channel 3 Yellow
Channel 4 Blue
Non-safety class: Black
Reliability Design Features
To meet the expected stringent reliability requirements and to keep partial power system failures from
having a cascading failure effect, the system should be designed with the following features.
1. The design assumes that three sets of lines (circuits) should connect the facility to the switchyard
(grid); two for fusion facility operation and one for main (power) generator output. To maximize
the separation of pulsed (tokamak) and plant loads, it is assumed that one set of circuits will
supply the tokamak loads while the second will supply the plant loads during fusion facility
operation. In the event of loss of one circuit, the fusion facility load would be shed (plasma
shutdown) and the remaining set of circuits would supply the plant loads. During the fusion
power generation (if designed), the third set of circuits will be used.
2. Since each safety bus has double supply paths, any single failure can be limited to a single bus.
This provides redundant backup capability with a high degree of independence.
3. Each type of power is subdivided into two, three, or four segments with limited cross ties to
provide redundancy without excessive cross-links.
4. The distribution system should have automatic fast transfer logic systems which sense the loss of
supply to a bus, determine what alternative supplies are available, and carry out switching to
connect the affected bus to a viable power supply.
5. Physical separation of redundant buses will be provided for protection against common causes
of failure (e.g. fires, or in-plant flooding).
6. Four 125 VDC buses are proposed to provide four independent channels of safety-class system
instrumentation to permit the use of single failure resistant, 2 out of 3, 2 out of 4, or 3 out of 4
channel voting logic on Fusion Facility Protection Systems.
7. The use of two emergency (standby) generators for Safety Train A and B is proposed, each with
the sufficient capability of providing power for the emergency loads needed to safely shut down
the fusion facility.
8. Suitable test capability will be required to allow periodic testing of all safety-class systems and
automatic transfer systems as well as periodic operation of all circuit breakers and disconnects
without adversely affecting system operation or compromising safety. Depending on the
reliability requirements, such testing may have to be on-line.
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