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Contingencies
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Guidelines For Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities
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Contingency 1e


DOE-STD-3007-93
Contingency 1b
Any leak of the transfer line to D-Wing will result in solution drainage into safe
bottles or a spill into a safe slab configuration.
The jacket diameters of the double walled sections (3" and 4") are less than the subcritical
fissile solution diameter limits given on Figure 2.3 of TID-70162. The jackets (like the transfer
line) are continuously sloped to avoid solution holdup, and are designed of material compatible
with the nitric-acid based fissile solution. Minor leakage would drain to the safe bottles; monthly
inventory efforts include checking such bottles for material. Should the liquid not be detected in a
partially loaded bottle, or if the leak were at a greater rate, either bottle could overfill and result in
a simple solution spill onto the floor in areas designed for safe spill retention.
Any leak from a non-jacketed section of the transfer line (from the west wall area of Room
1021 to the west edge of the storage array, or from the east edge of the storage array to the
Room 1022 wall penetration) would result in a simple solution leak in a process area that excludes
unsafe geometry containers. Established practices exist and would be strictly followed for
material cleanup (use 4-liter beakers or process area mop buckets).
Contingency 1c
Overfill of the D-Wing solution storage tanks will result in a simple spill of fissile
solution into a safe slab geometry.
D-Wing is designed as a dedicated fissile solution storage area, therefore, such a spill
should be of no consequence for a criticality safety standpoint. Mop buckets or 4-liter beakers
would be used for material cleanup.
Contingency 1d
Adequate controls are in place to preclude criticality due to misuse of the wet
vacuum system.
1-8


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