leakage in D-Wing would result in a simple solution spill onto the stainless steel floor
of the D-Wing solution storage area.
· Except for the double-walled line section Room 1010 plenum and D-1 Wing, all areas
near transfer lines, the trap or D-Wing storage tanks are identified as unsafe container
exclusion areas: open, large geometry containers are strictly prohibited without
specific Criticality Safety approval.
· Administrative control is exercised for use of the wet vacuum for transfers.
Procedurally, the operator is to observe F-1202 to avoid overfill. Minor carryover
(splatter, etc.) to F-1201 would be routinely expected. Occasionally, overfill of F-
1202 might briefly occur. In such case, engineered operational controls (level alarm
plus interlocked block valve on vacuum line) are provided for F-1201. These
operational controls are not considered to be required from a criticality safety
standpoint - the primary point of criticality safety control is that the final wet vacuum
trap in the northwest section of Room 1022 must not be allowed to overfill. As
required by other CSAs, any alarm of this trap requires that use of wet vacuum
immediately stop. (Manual block valves are present at the trap.) The solution source
must be identified and corrected before use of the wet vacuum may resume. Weekly
testing is required for the alarm system on this final trap.
· Selection of the correct container (safe bottle) for drainage of solution is an
administrative control. The use of proper equipment for spill cleanup (4-liter beakers
or process area mop buckets) is also an administrative control.
NOTE: Detailed interaction considerations are not warranted here. The analyses of other
CSAs provide interaction considerations for all fixed process equipment in the west area of Room
1021, including F-1202.