All calculations documented in this evaluation were performed on an IBM PS/2 Model 60
operating under DOS Version 3.10 with Version 1.0 of the IBM PRO FORTRAN Compiler.
Configuration Release 3.0 of the ANISN/PC code was used for the evaluation and was verified
for proper operation on the IBM PS/2 Model 60 computational platform by repeating the 21
sample problems as detailed in the Software Quality Assurance Package. A more detailed
description of this verification effort is given in Reference 8.
As required by DOE1, "The double contingency principle shall be used as a minimum to
ensure that a criticality accident is an extremely unlikely event. Compliance with the double
contingency principle requires that two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process
or system conditions occur before a criticality accident is possible."
As shown in Table 2 and the results in Section 6.0, the requirements of the double
contingency principle are met for the proposed shipment of radioactive waste within the
boundaries of the INEL. The barriers associated with these contingencies (i.e., accident
prevention and fissile inventory verification measures) are yet to be determined.
Contingencies (unlikely events)
An accident that causes all plutonium in a shipment
Accident prevention measures
to form into a homogenous mixture of polyethylene
(to be determined)
(60 vol.%), water (40 vol.%), and Pu-239 in
optimally moderated and reflected spherical
geometry. (This scenario is considered incredible
Exceeding the operating mass limit (160 FGE of
Fissile mass verification
Pu-239) by a factor of at least 2.5 (405 FGE of Pu-
measures (to be determined)
239 can result in a k-effective value of 1.0 under
optimally moderated, reflected, and configured
conditions). Waste shipments will typically contain
only a few grams Pu per shipment.