Liquids in tank D-2403 are sampled and, if less than the waste transfer limit, pumped by pumps
P2403 A/B in glovebox 2403 into Building 374 receiving tanks D811 A/B. Liquids which do not
meet the waste transfer limit are either further filtered or vacuum transferred into tanks D-2401
A/B/C/D and reprocessed in the CWTS.
The system has only been in operation for a relatively short amount of time, such that any hold-up
of fissionable material would be contamination only. Also, the CWTS is in locations with
appropriate criticality detector coverage.
For further details of this system please reference procedures 4-U84-C0-6090, "Building 371
Caustic Waste Treatment System" and 4-R76-WO-5017, "Caustic Waste Transfer from Building
There are no unique documentation requirements for this evaluation.
4.1 The CWTS was designed with geometrically favorable tanks and equipment. Thus,
evaluation methodology consists primarily of identification of components which meet established
standards and criteria for geometrically favorable equipment. In addition, this evaluation
discusses tank draining in Building 371 and waste transfer to Building 374.
4.2 The following assumptions were used in this evaluation.
4.2.1 No fissionable solution ever overflowed into the building process vacuum system. This was
substantiated during conversation with Jack D. Weaver on 11/16/95. Mr. Weaver was one of the
supervisors of the building processes during facility startup and the duration in which the
processes were operated. Also, as the criticality engineer for Building 371 from 1983 through
1988, I did not respond to or observe any fissionable solution overflows into the building process
DISCUSSION OF CONTINGENCIES
Tanks, equipment in gloveboxes, and the activities associated with waste transfer to Building 374
and draining of Building 371 tanks are individually evaluated in section 6.0. Unlikely
contingencies are summarized as follows. Note that there are no credible criticality scenarios
associated with glovebox 18, since columns and filters are critically safe by dimension. In
addition, seismic events would only cause glass columns to break in glovebox 18 and that liquid
would be restricted to a critically safe 2" depth in the glovebox due to the criticality drain.