Quantcast Summary and Conclusions - s3007cn10145

 

Click here to make tpub.com your Home Page

Page Title: Summary and Conclusions
Back | Up | Next

Click here for thousands of PDF manuals

Google


Web
www.tpub.com

Home

   
Information Categories
.... Administration
Advancement
Aerographer
Automotive
Aviation
Construction
Diving
Draftsman
Engineering
Electronics
Food and Cooking
Logistics
Math
Medical
Music
Nuclear Fundamentals
Photography
Religion
   
   

 

Share on Google+Share on FacebookShare on LinkedInShare on TwitterShare on DiggShare on Stumble Upon
Back
Design Features (Passive and Active) and Administratively Controlled Limits & Requirements
Up
Guidelines For Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities
Next
References - s3007cn10146


DOE-STD-3007-93
3
3C
Both chemical analysis values must be < 0.1 gram fissile/liter,
before permitting the loading of EBR/TRR material into the
dissolver.
3
3D
The last rinse must be transferred out, before permitting the loading
of the EBR/TRR dissolution materials into the dissolver.
3
3E
The performance of the above items (3A, and 3B to 3D if
necessary) by the process operator must be independently verified
by a second individual, such as a supervisor.
8.0
Summary and Conclusions
A nuclear criticality safety evaluation (NCSE), including a double contingency analysis (DCA),
was conducted regarding the dissolution of EBR-II bundle DU006, and 81 TRR bundles, in the
Feanyon annular dissolver in four dissolver batches. An NCSE and DCA (Ref. 1 and 2) were
previously performed for dissolution of TRR rods in the F-canyon dissolver. The difference in
this NCSE, relative to Ref. 1 and 2, is that one EBR-II bundle (DU006) is also to be dissolved,
and that it will be placed by itself into a dissolver port without using an insert.
The EBR-II fuel in bundle DU006 is comparable to the fuel in the TRR bundles (Tables 1 to 4),
so that including the EBR-II bundle in the dissolution is a relatively small perturbation on what
has been dissolved in the past. For example, the average equivalent U-235 enrichment (including
a multiplier of 2.0 for plutonium) of the EBR-II bundle is 0.77 %, whereas the average equivalent
U-235 enrichment of the TRR bundles is 0.79 %. The equivalent U-235 loading of the EBR-
II.bundle, which would be loaded by itself into a port, is 2.21 kg, whereas the average equivalent
U-235 loading of six TRR bundles, which would be loaded into a Mark-42/TRR insert, is 2.29 kg.
Based on safe limits (13.1 kg U-235 at 1.0 % enrichment, and 10.0 kg U-235 at 1.0 %
enrichment) the various allowed configurations in the EBR/TRR dissolution were shown to be
critically safe: the EBR-II bundle DU006 placed in an isolated port (2.21 kg U-235 < 13.1 Kg U-
235 safe limit), six maximum plutonium TRR bundles in an isolated Mark-42/TRR insert (3.26 kg
U-235 < 10 kg U-235 safe limit), and the EBR-II bundle DU006 in close proximity to six
maximum plutonium TRR bundles (5.47 kg U-235 < 13.1 kg U-235 safe limit). Allowing for a
double vidation of administrative controls, the most severe credible configuration would result
from grouping 18 TRR rods together with the EBR-II rods. This could result from double
batching and a missing Mark-42/TRR insert. This configuration was also found to be critically
safe (9.09 kg U-235 < 13.1 kg U-235 safe limit).
The DCA initiating events that result from the presence of the TRR bundles in this EBR/TRR
dissolution were dealt with in Ref. 2. The administrative controls used for the previous TRR
dissolution should therefore be adopted for this EBR/TRR dissolution, with changes to handle the
EBR-II bundle, of course. The only new initiating event (IE #3) is the possibility of significant
fissile material being in the dissolver solution before the EBR/TRR materials are loaded into the
dissolver. A criticality safety limit (0.1 g fissile/liter) and criticality safety controls (CSCs) were
6-20


Privacy Statement - Press Release - Copyright Information. - Contact Us

Integrated Publishing, Inc.