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Requirements Documentation - s3007cn10135
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Guidelines For Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities
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Discussion of Contingencies cont'd


DOE-STD-3007-93
The envelope of criticality safety for dissolution of the EBR-II bundle and the TRR bundles is
summarized in Table 5, based on consideration of the nine criticality control parameters (fissile
mass, moderation, geometry, spacing, concentration / fissile density, neutron absorption,
enrichment, reflection, and temperature). Table 5 lists the bounding assumptions (BA) and
criticality safety limits (CSL) for the nine criticality control parameters. Since the average
equivalent enrichments of the EBR-II and TRR materials are both so low (0.77 % and 0.79 %;
respectively), the restrictions that had to be assumed in the criticality safety evaluation (Section 6)
are minimal: no limits were assumed on the moderation, spacing, neutron absorbers, reflection, or
temperature. The fissile mass and the enrichment are controlled only in the sense that the items
allowed to be loaded into the dissolver are restricted to the specified EBR-II bundle and TRR
bundles. The concentration / fissile density is controlled two ways: (1) The beginning of the first
batch will contain 5 0.1 gram fissile per liter in the jet heel after the last rinse just prior to the first
batch. This limit only applies if the enrichment of the materials in the previous dissolution
campaign > 0.9635 %.
Table 5
Summary of Criticality Safety Envelope for dissolution
Of EBR-II bundle and TRR Bundles
Criticality Control
Bounding Assumption (BA)
Criticality Safety Limit
Parameter
(CSL)
Fissile Mass
Unrestricted, except that only the
TRR bundles and EBR-II bundle
may be loaded into the dissolver.
Moderation
Unrestricted
Geometry
Fuel rods are unrestricted.
Annular dissolver geometry is
assumed.
Spacing
Unrestricted
Concentration, Fissile Density
Fuel rods are unrestricted.
Nitric acid concentration is high
enough in the dissolver to prevent
Pu polymerization. Must be
< 0.1 g fissile/liter in jet heel after
last rinse prior to first batch.
Absorbers
Unrestricted
Enrichment
Uranium is depleted (EBR-II
bundle) or is natural (TRR
bundles), since only the TRR
bundles and EBR-II bundle may
be loaded into the dissolver.
Reflection
Unrestricted
Temperature
Unrestricted
6-11


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