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Indentification,Formulation, Implemenation, and Maintenance of SACs
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Formulation of SACs - Continued - std118620040016


DOE-STD-1186-2004
2.2
Formulation of SACs
DOE O 420.1A, Facility Safety, Section 4.1.1.2, addresses the design requirements for nuclear
safety. The Order states:
"Nuclear facilities shall be designed with the objective of providing multiple layers of
protection to prevent or mitigate the unintended release of radioactive materials to the
environment. Defense in depth shall include: ... the provision of multiple means to
ensure critical safety functions (those basic safety functions needed to control the
processes, maintain them in a safe state, and to confine and mitigate radioactivity
associated with the potential for accidents with significant public radiological impact)...".
These principles also apply to the formulation, development, and implementation of the
ensemble of hazard controls, including SACs. Engineering evaluations, trade-offs, and
experience shall be used to develop practical SACs that achieve the functional safety
objectives.
Redundancy, independence, and diversity of hazard controls are important principles for
ensuring that exposure to a high consequence accident does not come about due to the failure
of a single barrier. When SACs are part of the hazard control ensemble, these principles are
applied to the ensemble. Designation of an SAC as the primary line of defense (i.e., control)
should be avoided whenever possible, because ACs are generally regarded as less dependable
due to the introduction of potential human error. However, if an SAC is the primary line of
defense for protection of the public, these principles should be applied to the SAC. The terms
redundant, independent, and diverse are discussed below:
Redundant: Important safety functions should not be protected by a single control. The
design process should strive to achieve an appropriate level of redundancy in the
development of controls. In this context, redundancy refers to a second control to provide
the same safety function (as distinguished from diverse controls).
Independent: Controls should be independent of the process being controlled, and to the
extent practicable from other controls that have been credited.
11


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