Section 4 provides guidance on the formats for treatment of SACs in TSRs.
Section 5 discusses causal and failure analyses as applied to SACs.
Section 6 presents TSR examples.
This Technical Standard clarifies and focuses existing requirements and guidance for the
development and implementation of ACs relied on to perform specific safety functions of
importance similar to those of safety SSCs. To focus attention on the unique issues associated
with this type of AC, this Standard introduces a classification of AC to be known as a Specific
AC (SAC). An SAC exists when an AC:
a. is identified in the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) as a control needed to prevent or
mitigate an accident scenario, and
b. has a safety function that would be SS or SC if the function were provided by an SSC.
This increased focus is intended to improve the dependability of these controls and to enhance
their availability to perform specific safety functions when needed. This Standard should be
used to comply with all DOE methods for DSAs and their associated TSRs for compliance with
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 830, "Nuclear Safety Management," when
developing and implementing SACs. It replaces interim guidance contained in Nuclear Safety
Technical Position (NSTP) 2003-1, Use of Administrative Controls for Specific Safety Functions.
The information contained in this Standard is intended for use by all Department elements,
including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and all contractors for
DOE-owned or DOE-leased, hazard category 1, 2, or 3, nuclear facilities or nuclear operations.
The guidance applies to DSAs complying with all the "safe harbor methods" of 10 CFR Part 830,
and the associated TSRs.