Bio For Nuclear Facility With Limited Operational Life

DOE-STD-3011-2002

explosive safety analyses, health and safety plans (HASPs), environmental impact statements

(EISs), etc. When existing information is not current and correct, cannot be verified, or does

not exist, the existing information must be supplemented.

The approach taken to supplement existing information should be pragmatic. It should be

consistent with the limited lifetime expectancy of the facility, so time consuming approaches

should be avoided whenever possible. Analyses should generally be qualitative, but

thorough. When adequate information is not available to fully support the DSA,

conservative compensatory approaches to assuring adequate safety should be considered and,

if adopted, the rationale for safety adequacy should be presented. The maximum use of the

graded approach philosophy, consistent with a responsible fulfillment of the Rule

requirements should be used.

The format, content, and guidance of DOE-STD-3009, chapters 2 through 6 should be used

to organize the existing information and when existing information must be supplemented, to

the following extent (i.e., it is not expected that the full formatting down to the lowest

subsection descriptions in DOE-STD-3009 must be used).

Facility description should be in a BIO chapter 2; hazard and accident analysis guidance in

chapter 3 of DOE-STD-3009 should be used when existing information must be

supplemented, and the results described in a BIO chapter 3, etc. Generally, thorough

qualitative hazards analyses should be expected. Under the Graded Approach subsection of

this format, a short description of the graded approach taken for the section and its rationale

should be presented.

Consistent with the Rule, hazard controls identified in hazards analysis that are safety

structures, systems, and components (safety SSCs) should be evaluated for classification as

safety class or safety significant SSCs according to the definition of those terms in the Rule

and the guidance in DOE-STD-3009. They should be described in a BIO chapter 4. Existing

information should be used to the maximum extent possible, supplemented where necessary.

The Rule (10 CFR 830.205) requires Technical Safety Requirements. These are derived

from the DSA (BIO). Information useful to link the BIO to the TSR document, such as the

bases of safety limits, etc., a listing of TSR design features and their rationales, and the bases

for safety management programs should be presented in a BIO chapter 5. As with Category

3 DSAs, the basis for safety management programs, and any facility-specific characteristics

of them that are necessary, is derived through hazards analyses. A listing of these programs,

with references to sitewide programs and the facility-specific characteristics should be

presented in summary table form.

If criticality hazards exist, a criticality safety program must be addressed in a BIO chapter 6.

The description should show how the program:

Ensures that operations with fissionable material remains subcritical under all normal and

credible abnormal conditions,

Identifies applicable nuclear criticality standards, and

Describes how the program meets applicable nuclear criticality standards.