Safety Policy

DOE-STD-6002-96

limit routine exposure to radiation and hazardous materials,

limit exposure to electromagnetic fields, and

control other industrial hazards.

These potential safety concerns are derived from fusion facility hazards (e.g., inven -

tories and energy sources); however, their impact on the public and worker safety

functions is extremely design specific. Careful attention to design can ameliorate the

potential safety concern without the need for add-on safety systems. Thus, the

requirements document provides safety design principles for these potential safety

concerns to assure that the public and worker safety function are met, thereby inte-

grating safety into the design process.

7. Safety Policy. The Safety Policy statement included in the Requirements Standard,

while generally extracted from similar statements elsewhere, contains some specific

language that is intended to convey specific meanings. The Safety Policy statement

specifically includes making public as well as worker risk subject to the ALARA prin-

ciple. The Safety Policy statement refers to workers "at" a facility and states that the

risk to workers at fusion facilities shall be no greater than those to which they would

be exposed at other industrial facilities where similar hazards are encountered. The

word "at" is intended to refer not only to normal operations but to off-normal condi-

tions as well. Thus, while recognizing that the workers' risk under off-normal condi-

tions at fusion facilities would be greater than for members of the public, the infer-

ence is clear that accepted norms for risk from an accident should be maintained.

8. Use of Codes and Standards. Codes and standards applicable to magnetic fusion

facilities may come from a variety of technologies, not just from the nuclear power

industry. Some of these may include conventional power systems, vacuum and

cryogenic technologies, magnetic systems, and the chemical industry. Furthermore,

not all codes and standards in use in the fission industry are applicable or appropri-

ate for fusion facilities. The intent of this Standard is that such codes and standards

are tools to be used to achieve the required ends of safety in magnetic fusion facili-

ties. For that reason, references to such codes and standards in DOE-STD-6002-96

are deliberately vague. That will allow the designers and operators of fusion facilities

great flexibility in determining which ones will be most appropriate and in negotiating

their use with regulators. Further, designers will have the responsibility of ensuring

that codes and standards used in the design are appropriate for that design.

9. Use of Fission Reactor Terminology and Concepts. The Requirements Standard

(DOE-STD-6002-96) has not employed some of the conventional fission terminology,

lexicon and concepts (e.g., loss-of-coolant accident). Two specific concepts deserve

mention here: (1) safety-class and safety-significant structures, systems, and com-

ponents (SSCs) and (2) the single failure criterion. The Requirements Standard does

not invoke the use of the concept of safety-class and safety-significant in classifying

SSCs. Instead, it requires that items important to safety be identified, leaving the