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| DOE-HDBK-1100-2004
Table 4.18. Example HAZOP Study for the Dock 8 HF Supply System
LINE/VESSEL: HF Supply Line To Vaporizer
December 28, 1992
__ of __
DATE:
PAGE:
GUIDE
SCEN-
COMMENTS/
WORD
DEVIATION
CAUSE
CONSEQUENCE
SAFETY LEVELS
ARIO
ACTION
No
No flow
Valve V-19 closed
Loss of HF to B-1 process;
No known protection.
1
Action Item: Determine
consequences unknown.
the level of protection
HF Vaporizer inlet header
available and potential
plugged/frozen
consequences in B-1
Wing.
Line rupture
HF release in area; possible
None
2
No Action: Unlikely
injuries/fatalities.
event; piping protected
against external impact.
No known protection.
3
Same as #1
Less
Low flow
Valve V-19 partially closed
Insufficient HF supply to
B-1 process; consequence
HF Vaporizer inlet header
unknown.
partially plugged/frozen
Local rapid flashing, rupture
Stack height designed to
4
disc/relief valve inadvertently
dissipate release.
opens, release to stack.
Release HF into storage area;
Valve V-28 closed,
5
Action Item: Consider
potential injuries/fatalities if
forcing release to stack.
administrative controls
people in area.
or actions to ensure V-28
is closed when operating.
More
High flow
None
6
High temperature
Fire; hot weather
Over-pressure; HF release;
Local temperature
7
No action: Unlikely
possible
indication on water
event.
heating loop.
injuries/fataliti
es.
Low temperature
Cold weather
Possible plugging of lines;
8
insufficient vaporization (see
consequences of no/less flow
scenarios #1-5).
Reverse
Backflow to HF
None
9
inlet line
50
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