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DOE-HDBK-1100-2004
Table 4.21 Time Estimates for Using the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Method
SCOPE
PREPARATION
EVALUATION
DOCUMENTATION
Simple/Small
System
2 to 6 hours
1 to 3 days
1 to 3 days
Complex/Large
Process
1 to 3 days
1 to 3 weeks
2 to 4 weeks
Source: CCPS 1992
Physical system boundaries encompass the equipment, the interfaces with other
processes, and the utility/support systems to be analyzed. Along with the physical system
boundaries, analysts should specify the levels of resolution for fault tree events reflecting
failures of both equipment and support systems (i.e., major component level,
subcomponent level, system level, and subsystem level). For example, analysts may set
the level of resolution at the subsystem level (electrical bus, cooling loop) for support
systems.
Other boundary conditions are the initial equipment configuration or the initial operating
conditions. Initial conditions reflect the initial state of all components and support
systems that are included in the FTA. This boundary condition describes the system in its
normal, unfailed state.
Unallowed events are those that are considered to be incredible or that, for some other
reason, are not to be considered in the analysis. For example, wiring failures might be
excluded from the analysis of an instrument system. Existing conditions are, for the
purposes of the FTA, events or conditions considered certain to occur. The unallowed
and existing conditions do not appear in the fault tree, but their effects must be
considered in developing other fault events as the fault tree is constructed.
Because a broadly scoped or poorly defined top event can lead to an inefficient analysis,
the top event should be precisely defined to show the "what," "when," and "where" of the
accident. Accordingly, analysts may specify other assumptions, as necessary, to define
the system or process to be analyzed. For example, analysts may assume that the process
is operating at 100 percent of normal capacity.
CONSTRUCTING THE FAULT TREE.
Fault tree construction begins at the top event and
proceeds, level by level, until all fault events have been traced to their basic contributing
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