Training cont'd - DOE-HDBK-1139-1-20060052

DOE-HDBK-1139/1-2006

Personnel who responded to a chemical spill of methyl acrylate were never briefed by facility

personnel. As a result, they did not assume command of the event, even though facility procedures

require the command to be transferred to Emergency Management and Response (EM&R) if the

facility does not have adequate resources to handle an event. The fact that the facility called for the

hazardous materials (HAZMAT) team and used the services of occupational medicine was a sign that

it did not have the necessary personnel to deal with the event, so EM&R should have assumed the

role of incident commander. Furthermore, no one was concerned about the flammability of the

chemical. No one called the fire department to respond as a precautionary measure. If the methyl

acrylate had ignited, a fire could have quickly spread through the rest of the lab. Also, if a fire had

occurred when the spill response team entered the room, they could have been severely burned.

(ORPS Report ALO-LA-LANL-TA55-1999-0032)

During a chlorine leak, the emergency response team was not totally familiar with the facility

systems. Plant operators had to tell them how to isolate chlorine cylinders and how to reset alarms to

determine if they were still detecting chlorine. (ORPS Report RL--PHMC-S&W-1999- 0002)

A researcher did not immediately notify his manager or emergency response personnel after a vessel

ruptured and expelled a mixture of 130 degrees centigrade trichloroethylene and hydrogen peroxide

from the face of a fume hood. (ORPS Report RL--PHMC-PNNLBOPER-1998- 0022)

Facility personnel waited approximately 30 minutes before reporting a 2-gallon spill of radioactive

phosphoric acid. Also, personnel in the spill area did not observe restrictions on eating, drinking, and

smoking, and some workers assisted emergency operations personnel without wearing personal

protective equipment. (ORPS Report RFO--KHLL-LIQWASTE-1998-0002)

B-5