Incorporation of Weapon Response Information

DOE-NA-STD-3016-2006

and DOE O 414.1C, or superseding directives. This procedure shall establish the requisite criteria for

training and qualification of personnel providing expert judgment and performing expert elicitation.

Peer reviews are performed in order to ensure completeness and accuracy and to limit the potential bias of

weapons response information, while bringing in additional sources of expertise. Peer reviewers shall

have the requisite technical knowledge to understand and challenge the information, but must not have

been involved in the development of the information.

Each organization providing formal weapon response, in accordance with this standard, shall perform

peer reviews of the information prior to its release. Each organization shall do so in accordance with a

DA procedure that describes the peer review process including criteria for establishing and maintaining

the requisite training, qualification, and independence of the peer reviewers. This procedure shall be

included in the DA's QAP submitted for DOE/NNSA approval per 10 CFR 830.120, Subpart A and DOE

O 414.1C, or superseding directives.

The level of rigor employed in DA expert elicitation and peer review processes must be commensurate

with the secondary role all probabilities play within the HAR.

6.2.5 Incorporation of Weapon Response Information

The PPC shall incorporate the weapon response information into the hazard analysis. In order to preclude

extensive, last-minute reviews, the DAs shall work with the PPC to ensure appropriate use of the weapon

response information.

6.3 Accident Selection and Analysis

Hazard scenarios that are not screened for HEVR or IND consequences are designated as Design Basis

Accidents (DBAs), and are retained for consideration in the accident analysis section per DOE STD-3009,

or superseding directives.

The specific operations covered by a HAR run for a limited duration of weeks or months. Therefore, the

HAR accident sequence likelihood estimations should be represented in units of probability per single

unit weapon operation (e.g., assembly, disassembly). Accident scenarios are binned in each consequence

category and are ranked in terms of their approximate probabilities (see section 8). The overall (and

approximate) probability of each consequence category (i.e., IND and HEVR) for scenarios analyzed in

the HAR should be provided by the summation of the probabilities of all accident scenarios contributing

to the category. This process helps to provide an order-of-magnitude understanding of the probability of

each consequence category, as well as for the degree of contribution of each accident scenario to the

overall probability of each consequence category. In addition, other useful information such as measures

of importance can also be readily obtained.

Natural Phenomenon Hazards (NPH) and external initiating event likelihood, typically expressed in terms

of frequency, must be converted into probability based on the scenario attributes in order to provide a

common basis for comparing accidents within a HAR.

6.4 Control Identification and Effectiveness Determinations

The approach to the identification and classification of controls in the hazard analysis is the same as the

process described in DOE-STD-3009, or superseding directives, with the added simplification that any

IND or explosive dispersal (HEVR) of plutonium should be treated as an event that will challenge the

Evaluation Guideline of 25 rem to the maximally exposed offsite individual. Control effectiveness

determinations should include a discussion of single failure faults in the final control set.