variety of sources including surveillance assessments, significant finding investigations, enhanced
surveillance, and modeling. This information flows informally between the production sites and the DAs
as part of day-to-day operations and takes a variety of forms. It could be a presentation made by a
researcher, a technical paper related to a component similar to one found in a weapon, or even a phone
call between the DAs and the PPC. Information exchange of this kind is encouraged within the nuclear
weapon complex to continuously monitor and potentially improve the safety and efficiency of NEOs.
New information that changes, or has the potential to change, information relied upon within the SARs
and HARs is evaluated through the site's new information and unreviewed safety question evaluation
processes per 10 CFR 830 as appropriate. Once DA management has determined that the information is
developed enough to require action and is applicable to production plant operations, the information must
be formally transmitted from the DA to the PPC utilizing the Engineering Authorization System, or
equivalent. The information should also be shared with the other DAs for potential applicability to their
systems. Actions in response to this information at the PPC site (e.g., cessation of certain activities,
compensatory measures) are taken by the PPC as deemed necessary with the appropr iate notifications to
the local NNSA/DOE office per the current requirements.