Hazard and Accident Analysis - DOE-STD-1120-1-20050021

DOE-STD-1120-2005/Vol. 1

of radioactive, hazardous and mixed wastes expected to be generated during the

decommissioning process should be described. Any temporary storage of generated or packaged

waste should also be described. These activities may require additional hazard analysis and

controls, as well as special permitting.

3.2

Hazard and Accident Analysis

Overall, this section of the DSA should present the methodology used to identify and evaluate

hazards, as well as the results of these efforts. The hazard and accident analysis approach and

format presented in DOE-STD-3009-94, Chapter 3, should be applied to decommissioning

operations, with additional clarifications noted in the following subsections below.

Hazard analysis activities that support Subpart B requirements of Part 830, as well as

HAZWOPER and other directives and regulations, may be integrated. This is a recommended

practice that is discussed in DOE-HDBK-1063-2003, Integration of Multiple Hazard Analysis

Requirements and Activities. Integration supports a common baseline of hazards information

and assumptions and encourages communication between various safety, environmental, security

and operations personnel.

3.2.1Methodology

3.2.1.1

Hazard Identification

This subsection of the DSA should identify the method used by analysts to identify hazardous

material inventories and energy sources that could initiate or contribute to a potential release of

hazardous substances, hazardous waste or radiological materials. The dynamic nature of

decommissioning and potential for unknown hazards requires a thorough identification of

hazards. Consideration should be given to the remaining hazardous materials (e.g. material

quantity, form, and location) and energy sources that exist or will be introduced as a result of

decommissioning activities. New fire ignition sources or flammable materials, as well as the

potential accumulation of combustible wastes are all hazards that can be introduced or worsened

because of decommissioning activities. Hazards related to the physical state and degradation of

SSCs should also be identified. As an example, the scabbling of degraded concrete structures

could decrease structural stability and increase the risk of failing a material confinement barrier.

Hazardous material inventory and facility design information (e.g., drawings, design criteria,

instrumentation diagrams) may be unavailable or in poor condition at some facilities. This will

necessitate the use of "process knowledge" and/or intrusive or non-intrusive characterization,

depending on the level of hazards information needed to support a defensible analysis. The

following activities should be conducted to support a thorough identification of hazards:

Assess existing facility status and hazards information by collecting and reviewing

available facility operating records and existing safety analysis information for previous

phases of facility operation (e.g., DSAs, Safety Analysis Reports, Fire Hazards Analysis).

Interview past and present employees, as necessary, regarding facility operating history

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