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| DOE-STD-1020-2002
in the adjacent SSCs pounding together; (3) displacements of adjacent SSCs during seismic
response resulting in failure of connecting pipes or cables; (4) flooding and exposure to fluids
from vessels or piping systems ruptured as a result of earthquake motion; and (5) effects of
seismic-induced fires.
The occurrence of an earthquake affects many or all SSCs in a facility. Hence, it is
possible to have multiple seismic-induced failures of SSCs. These common cause effects must
be considered in design or evaluation. For example, multiple failures in a tank farm can result in
loss of contents greater than that held in any single tank which in turn could overflow a retention
berm and/or flood adjacent SSCs. The effects of this large quantity of tank contents on SSCs
must be considered.
Earthquake ground shaking also affects building contents and nonstructural features
such as windows, facades, and hanging lights. It is common for the structure to survive an
earthquake without serious structural damage but to have significant and expensive damage of
contents. This damage could be caused by overturned equipment or shelves, fallen lights or
ceilings, broken glass, and failed infill walls. Glass and architectural finishes may be brittle
relative to the main structure, and they can fail well before structural damage occurs. Windows
and cladding must be specially attached in order to accommodate the relative seismic movement
of the structure without damage. Building contents can usually be adequately protected against
earthquake damage by anchorage to the floor, walls, or ceiling.
Facilities in which radioactive materials are handled are typically designed with
redundant confinement barriers between the hazardous material and the environment. Such
barriers include:
1.
The building shell.
2.
Ventilation system filtering and negative pressurization that inhibits outward air flow.
3.
Storage canisters, glove boxes, tanks, or silos for storage or handling within the
building.
Release of radioactive material to the environment requires failure of two or more of
these barriers. Thus, seismic design considerations for these facilities aim to prevent collapse
and control cracks or openings (e.g., failed doors, failed infill walls) such that the building can
function as a hazardous materials confinement barrier. Seismic design considerations also
include adequate anchorage and bracing of storage cannisters, glove boxes, tanks or silos and
adequate support of ventilation ducting, filters, and fans to prevent their loss of function during
an earthquake. Long-term storage canisters are usually very rugged, and they are not particularly
vulnerable to earthquake damage.
Earthquake damage to components of a facility such as tanks, equipment,
instrumentation, and distribution systems can also cause injuries, loss of function, or loss of
confinement. Many of these items can survive strong earthquake ground shaking with adequate
anchorage or restraint. Some items, such as large vertical tanks, must be examined in more
detail to assure that there is an adequate lateral force-resisting system for seismic loads. For
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