Department of Energy Plutonium Vulnerability Analysis Study

DOE-STD-1128-98

Guide of Good Practices for Occupational Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities

the only barrier that separates the workers from the plutonium. Plutonium solutions are the form

most difficult to store and present unique hazards. Plutonium scrap and residue forms are reactive,

and some are corrosive enough to degrade containers. Plutonium metals and oxides generally

present fewer problems, but much of this material is stored in plastic, which can react with

plutonium and cause container failure.

Facility conditions that cause vulnerabilities include aging safety systems, holdup of plutonium in

process systems, and design problems that weaken the ability to mitigate accidents like fires or

earthquakes. In addition to their impact on workers, such large-scale events have the potential to

release plutonium that could effect the public and environment. Institutional vulnerabilities involve

incomplete safety analyses, loss of experienced staff, and operational problems such as a backlog of

maintenance items on systems that are important to safety.

The assessment found Rocky Flats Buildings 771 and 776 to be the most vulnerable facilities, based

on combinations of their vulnerabilities and amount of plutonium they hold. These buildings are

more than 35 years old and have design deficiencies. The next group of most vulnerable facilities

are the Savannah River Site's Building 235-F, FB-Line and Old HB-Line; Hanford's Plutonium

Finishing Plant; and Rocky Flats Building 779, 707, and 371. The material in these facilities

includes plutonium solutions and reactive materials.

This assessment provided the information base that will improve the Department's plan for safely

managing the future disposition of its plutonium. While most vulnerabilities were already known,

this assessment improved DOE's understanding of the issues. It has also enabled the Department to

document vulnerabilities, identify new ones and set priorities which will establish a systematic

approach to corrective action. DOE began formulating corrective action plans to achieve safe and

stable interim storage in September 1994.

The assessment reached several conclusions. Plutonium package failures and facility degradation

will increase in the future unless problems are addressed in an aggressive manner. The Department

needs a strong, centrally coordinated program to achieve safe interim storage of plutonium. Priority

must be given to plutonium solutions, chemically reactive scrap/residues and packaging with

plastics or other organic compounds. Much of the Department's plutonium inventory, including

plutonium in holdup, must be better characterized and site-specific programs must be implemented

to establish package design lives. Management priorities at some site should be reassessed to

provide proper attention to those facilities identified as most vulnerable by this assessment. Sites

must evaluate institutional vulnerabilities such as the loss qualified staff, and compensate for them.

Standards or guidelines for packaging, storage and surveillance of plutonium scrap/residues and

solutions must be developed and implemented. Finally, the Department and its stakeholders have

just begun to work together to clean up the remnants of weapons production processes.

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