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| DOE-STD-1128-98
Guide of Good Practices for Occupational Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities
Detailed guidance on the implementation of the Order requirements has been published by
the DOE Office of Emergency Management (DOE, 1997). The Emergency Management
Guides (EMGs) have been published. The EMGs specify acceptable methods of meeting the
Order requirements. Individual guides have been published for the hazards assessment
process and for program elements.
9.2
SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FOR PLUTONIUM
FACILITIES
This section provides technical guidance that is specifically applicable to the development and
implementation of emergency management programs for plutonium facilities. It is intended to
supplement, not replace, the more general recommendations provided in the EMGs.
9.2.1 Hazards Assessment
The emergency management hazards assessment for a facility that stores or processes
plutonium or its compounds should follow the basic assessment process outlined in the DOE
Emergency Management Guide. Guidance for Hazards Assessment (DOE, 1992a). The
Emergency Management Hazard Assessment (EMHA) should be based upon the facility
specific Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which develops facility and operations hazards.
Unique properties and characteristics of plutonium and its compounds may need to be
considered at certain steps in the hazards assessment process.
(a) Description of Facility and Operations. The properties of the hazardous material do
not significantly affect the manner in which this step of the hazards assessment is
performed, except to the extent that plutonium safety considerations may mandate more
detailed descriptions of certain facility physical or operational features.
(b) Identifying and Screening the Hazards. The objective of this step is to identify
hazards that are significant enough to warrant consideration in a facility's emergency
management program. It is recommended that screening thresholds (or quantities) be
selected for each hazardous material. This screening threshold value is then compared
to the inventories of the material at risk of being released from a single event. If a
particular inventory of material is less than the screening threshold value, the
consequences of its release are presumed to be minimal. The potential release of that
inventory need not be analyzed further.
The screening threshold value should be based on the dominant hazardous
property of a material. For all plutonium isotopes and all its chemical forms,
radiotoxicity is the property of most concern.
9-3
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