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DOE-STD-1120-2005/Vol. 2
Example 9:
Screening Task Hazard Analysis Against Existing Safety Basis
A plutonium processing facility was entering deactivation. Although many of the activities were closely
related to the operations activities, the deactivation included many one-time tasks performed under
varying facility conditions that could have led to new or increased worker safety hazards. The work
team's planned work task was to remove residual plutonium material from gloveboxes. As part of this
process, a task hazard analysis was drafted. In order to verify that job hazards were not outside the
previously identified safety envelope, the task hazard analysis results were screened against the existing
hazard baseline document (e.g., facility DSA). The task hazard analysis identified potential hazards that
included personnel radiological exposure, criticality considerations, and physical hazards including
punctures and pinch points. Since these hazards were consistent with those encountered during glovebox
operations, and the controls were identified in both training and current procedures, no additional hazard
analysis was warranted for the planned activity. However, to ensure that the appropriate controls were
included in the work process, the evaluation was reviewed and approved by the criticality safety
representative, industrial safety representative, and radiological personnel. The work plan and final task
hazard analysis were completed and used in the pre-job briefing to ensure that personnel understood the
hazards and controls associated with the activity prior to beginning work.
HAZARD CONTROLS
Example 10:
Administrative Controls for a Non-nuclear Facility
A non-nuclear laboratory facility with gloveboxes was to be deactivated in preparation for long-term
S&M. An integrated hazard analysis was performed to identify the hazards and the requisite controls.
The analysis considered hazards related to the storage of chemicals, as well as those hazards introduced
from the chosen work methods.
The analysis identified three administrative controls that supported and enhanced existing programmatic
health and safety controls. These controls specify that: (1) all hazardous substances be inventoried and a
"living" inventory be maintained and updated on a weekly basis; (2) all hazardous substances to be
brought into the facility, proposed activities, new (or changes to) procedures, and discoveries be screened
and hazards analyzed as necessary, using a management of change process; and (3) all tasks have an
initial hazard analysis performed the first time the activity is completed. In addition, industrial safety, IH,
and health protection personnel; workers; and the facility supervisor reviewed and approved identified
worker safety controls. In order to ensure proper implementation of these controls, all facility workers
B-11


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