Department of Energy Plutonium Vulnerability Analysis Study cont'd

DOE-STD-1128-98

Institutional vulnerabilities involve incomplete safety analyses, loss of experienced staff,

and operational problems such as a backlog of maintenance items on systems that are

important to safety.

The assessment found Rocky Flats Buildings 771 and 776 to be the most vulnerable

facilities, based on combinations of their vulnerabilities and amount of plutonium they

hold. These buildings are more than 35 years old and have design deficiencies. The next

group of most vulnerable facilities are the Savannah River Site's Building 235-F, FB-Line

and Old HB-Line; Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant; and Rocky Flats Building 779,

707, and 371. The material in these facilities includes plutonium solutions and reactive

materials.

This assessment provided the information base that will improve the Department's plan for

safely managing the future disposition of its plutonium. While most vulnerabilities were

already known, this assessment improved DOE's understanding of the issues. It has also

enabled the Department to document vulnerabilities, identify new ones and set priorities

which will establish a systematic approach to corrective action. DOE began formulating

corrective action plans to achieve safe and stable interim storage in September 1994.

The assessment reached several conclusions. Plutonium package failures and facility

degradation will increase in the future unless problems are addressed in an aggressive

manner. The Department needs a strong, centrally coordinated program to achieve safe

interim storage of plutonium. Priority must be given to plutonium solutions, chemically

reactive scrap/residues and packaging with plastics or other organic compounds. Much of

the Department's plutonium inventory, including plutonium in holdup, must be better

characterized and site-specific programs must be implemented to establish package design

lives. Management priorities at some site should be reassessed to provide proper attention

to those facilities identified as most vulnerable by this assessment. Sites must evaluate

institutional vulnerabilities such as the loss qualified staff, and compensate for them.

Standards or guidelines for packaging, storage and surveillance of plutonium scrap/residues

and solutions must be developed and implemented. Finally, the Department and its

stakeholders have just begun to work together to clean up the remnants of weapons

production processes.

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