Specific Guidance on Emergency Management for Plutonium Facilities

DOE-STD-1128-98

Detailed guidance on the implementation of the Order requirements has been

published by the DOE Office of Emergency Management (DOE, 1997). The

Emergency Management Guides (EMGs) have been published. The EMGs specify

acceptable methods of meeting the Order requirements. Individual guides have

been published for the hazards assessment process and for program elements.

9.2

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FOR PLUTONIUM

FACILITIES

This section provides technical guidance that is specifically applicable to the development

and implementation of emergency management programs for plutonium facilities. It is

intended to supplement, not replace, the more general recommendations provided in the

EMGs.

9.2.1

Hazards Assessment

The emergency management hazards assessment for a facility that stores or

processes plutonium or its compounds should follow the basic assessment process

outlined in the DOE Emergency Management Guide, Guidance for Hazards

Assessment (DOE, 1992a). The Emergency Management Hazard Assessment

(EMHA) should be based upon the facility specific Safety Analysis Report (SAR),

which develops facility and operations hazards. Unique properties and

characteristics of plutonium and its compounds may need to be considered at

certain steps in the hazards assessment process.

(a) Description of Facility and Operations. The properties of the hazardous

material do not significantly affect the manner in which this step of the hazards

assessment is performed, except to the extent that plutonium safety

considerations may mandate more detailed descriptions of certain facility

physical or operational features.

(b) Identifying and Screening the Hazards. The objective of this step is to

identify hazards that are significant enough to warrant consideration in a

facility's emergency management program. It is recommended that screening

thresholds (or quantities) be selected for each hazardous material. This

screening threshold value is then compared to the inventories of the material at

risk of being released from a single event. If a particular inventory of material

is less than the screening threshold value, the consequences of its release are

presumed to be minimal. The potential release of that inventory need not be

analyzed further.

The screening threshold value should be based on the dominant hazardous property

of a material. For all plutonium isotopes and all its chemical forms, radiotoxicity is

the property of most concern.

9-3