Classification of Hazard Controls and Technical Safety Requirements

DOE-STD-3007-2007

A linking document (referred to in this standard as a "Criticality Control Review" or CCR) should be

used to summarize the results of this evaluation process for criticality hazards and controls. The process

leading to the development of the CCR should be specified as part of the CSP description document. The

CSP should also document how revisions and updates to the CCR and CSEs are treated relative to the

USQ process. The advantages to development of a CCR are:

1. The CCR now becomes the technical reference to the DSA for criticality safety; and

2. The CCR allows summarizing several CSEs for a process or a facility in a single document so

that identification of commonly important attributes and controls is possible.

A. CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD CONTROLS AND TECHNICAL SAFETY

REQUIREMENTS

The process of selecting hazard controls includes classification of them as safety class SSCs, safety

significant SSCs; design features; administrative controls that are major contributors to defense in depth,

which are designated as specific administrative controls; or a lesser category, sometimes described as

SSCs important to safety; and administrative controls. DOE-STD-1186-2004, Specific Administrative

Controls, provides guidance applicable to specific administrative controls. DOE G 421.1-2, Section 5.3

provides a general discussion of the hierarchy of safety controls.

All controls needed for safety (criticality related, radiation safety, industrial safety, etc.) are identified and

characterized during the course of the hazards and accident analyses performed in support of the DSA. A

subset of all controls will usually get safety class or safety significant designation. Controls that are

identified and discussed in CSEs may or may not end up being elevated to the level of TSRs or identified

in the DSA. Depending on the situation, NCS controls that are incorporated into the DSA would be

TSRs, design features, or administrative controls. DSA-level controls should be identified on a case-by-

case basis and should be graded according to the guidance in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice No. 3 or

successor document to establish the hierarchy of hazard controls. Hierarchy requires that engineering

controls with an emphasis on safety-related SSCs be preferable to administrative controls or specific

administrative controls14 due to the inherent uncertainty of human performance. Specific administrative

controls14 may be used to help implement a specific aspect of a programmatic administrative control that

is credited in the safety analysis and, therefore, has a higher level of importance.