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DOE-STD-3007-2007
especially if high-hazard operations were in progress. In this case, it may be preferable to have a local
immediate alarm notifying the affected workers followed by a more deliberate planned emergency
response for the rest of the facility. Full benefit of localized/portable criticality accident detector and
alarm systems and the full suite of detection and annunciation options at the disposal of the facility
manager may be considered and appropriately credited for their safety function.
Removal of CAASs, whether fixed, permanent, temporary, portable, or transportable systems, from
existing facilities should be justified with a CSE evaluating the need for a CAAS in terms of the overall
risk benefit of such a system as discussed above. For a CAAS removal evaluation, an important part of a
strong argument is a thorough facility characterization detailing the quantity, form, and distribution of
fissionable material in the facility. In order to support an assertion that the CAAS is not required, the
potential holdup in a facility shall9 be addressed. New facilities that previously have not processed or
handled fissionable materials obviously have no holdup. But holdup in older facilities shall9 be
addressed. Utilization of operating personnel or facility experts with direct knowledge of operations
spanning the full-life cycle of the facility is important. When personnel with direct knowledge of past
operations are not available, documentation relevant to the facility operations and off-normal events
should be used. A thorough characterization should include:
Description of the operating history of the facility sufficient to support conclusions about the
presence or absence of fissionable materials in various locations;
Description of accidents or process upsets, particularly those that might have left significant
quantities of fissionable materials in unexpected locations (e.g., fires, floods, spills, etc.); and
Description of current material inventories, including all accountable fissionable material,
inventory differences, and comprehensive fissionable material assays.
The characterization should also include a brief description of assay methods used, their accuracy,
potential weaknesses, comprehensiveness of the assays, and the meaning of any stated uncertainties.
B. OPERATIONS WITH SHIELDING AND CONFINEMENT
ANSI/ANS-8.10-1983, Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in Operations with Shielding and
Confinement, provides criteria for adequate shielding and confinement that may permit relaxation of
criticality safety requirements from those required in unshielded facilities. The standard permits reduced
conservatism in the process analysis and single-contingency operations when the shielding and
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