Methodology - doe-std-3009-94_cn3

DOE-STD -3009-94

3.3.1 Methodology

This section presents the methodology used to identify and characterize hazards

and to perform a systematic evaluation of basic accidents.

3.3.1.1

Hazard Identification

This subsection identifies the method used by analysts to identify and

inventory hazardous materials and energy sources (in terms of quantity, form,

and location) associated with the facility processes or associated operations

(e.g., waste handling). This methodology first identifies sources of

referenced information that are not an integral part of the DSA hazard

identification. Possible sources of such information include fire hazard

analyses, health and safety plans, job safety analyses, occurrence reporting

histories, etc.

The DSA covers worker safety issues related to hazards in processes and

associated activities. It is not the intention of the DSA to cover safety as it

relates to the common industrial hazards that make up a large portion of basic

OSHA regulatory compliance. It is important not to expend DSA resources on

those hazards for which national consensus codes and/or standards (e.g.,

OSHA regulations) already define and regulate appropriate practices without

the need for special analysis. As noted in this Standard's definition of

"hazard," standard industrial hazards are identified only to the degree they are

initiators and contributors to accidents in main processes and activities. For

example, worker electrocution from electrical wiring faults is not a DSA issue.

However, the existence of 440 volt AC cabling in a glovebox would be

identified as a potential accident initiator for a scenario (i.e., fire) involving

hazardous materials.

The distinction cited in the previous examples makes careful identification of

hazards covered in the DSA essential so that potential worker hazards are not

overlooked. As part of the identification process, the basis that was used in the

hazard screening to remove standard industrial hazards or insignificant hazards

from further consideration needs to be presented as well. For these cases, the

DSA hazard analysis process interfaces with other programs such as specific

topics of OSHA compliance or general industrial safety. These interfaces must

be identified. Some of these compliance issues, while not presented in the

DSA as such, may be a portion of a safety management program committed to

by the facility. An example of this is the Health and Safety Plans required by

OSHA in accordance with the Hazard Waste Operations and Emergency

Response program. This could be one element of the "plans, procedures, and

training for governing operations involving radioactive and hazardous waste"

specified in Section 9.3, "Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management

Organization."

This subsection also indicates the sources from which information was

obtained, such as flowsheet inventories, maximum historical inventories,

vessel sizes, contamination analyses, etc. The interpretation of the data used to

Page 31