Application Examples

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

7.0 APPLICATION EXAMPLES

This handbook provides a number of cautions against misapplication of the release data

presented. The fundamental purpose of the handbook, however, is not to complicate the

process of assigning release fractions, but to simplify it. This chapter is intended to assist

the handbook user by providing examples of ARF selection within the context of specific

accident models. In some cases, the examples may be trivial. In all cases, they attempt to

demonstrate the fundamental point that pursuit of absoluteness in accounting for local release

conditions is unwarranted. It represents a goal that often is not realistically attainable and is

of little use for the overall purposes of hazard assessment. As noted in the Introduction of

this document, the ARF and RF values provided are only intended to allow a better

understanding of bounding consequences for accidents modelled at nonreactor nuclear

facilities and to provide information to support general bases for decisionmaking.

7.1

APPLICATION METHODOLOGY

From a kilogram of material, the phenomena covered by this handbook can produce release

estimates varying from micrograms to hundreds of grams. Accordingly, the most significant

activity in assigning ARFs is the development of a physical model of the accident and its

associated stresses. This model may range from a rudimentary statement (e.g., the material

dropped two feet) to a condition requiring phenomenological engineering calculations to

specify parameters (e.g., nature and strength of an explosion). Without such models, ARFs

have no relationship to physical details at a given facility and are useful only for drawing

gross conclusions (e.g., overall facility hazard classification as Category 2 or 3 in

DOE-STD-1027-92, 100% release has consequences below a given value).

The thought process leading to development of a model, hazard identification and evaluation

(i.e., hazard analysis) with potential followup by quantitative accident analysis, is described

in: (1) DOE technical standards such as DOE-STD-3009-94, "Preparation Guide for U.S.

Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports;" (2) DOE

technical reports such as DOE/EH-0340, "Example Process Hazard Analysis of a Department

of Energy Water Chlorination Process;" and (3) any number of recognized textbooks such as

"Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" (American Institute of Chemical Engineers,

1992). The identification and analysis process is at least as important as any associated

source term estimate as it has a broader purpose than merely defining the five numerical

parameters used in such calculations. The overall process, of which identifying a model for

source term and release estimation is only one component, allows for identification and

evaluation of a wider variety of more subtle issues that cannot be generically captured by a

release or dose construct (e.g., design or operational deficiencies not easily defined by

"back-end" dose models).

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