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DOE-HDBK-3010-94
6.0 Inadvertent Nuclear Criticality; Summary
Airborne Source Term = (MARc3 x DRc3 x ARFc3)
(6-3)
where: MARc3 = inventory of radionuclides from criticality in dry, solids
calculated by computer codes such as ORIGEN2 based on
1E+17 total fissions; or, [1E+17 fissions/1E+19 fissions] X
table (see footnote 1).
DRc3 = Damage Ratio for radionuclides generated by criticality:
metal pieces, 0.1
fines, (e.g., powders), 1.0.
ARFc3 = Airborne Release Fraction: 5E-1 for noble gases, 5E-2 for
iodine4.
Large Storage Arrays
This configuration deals with driving together by external forces large amounts of material
(i.e., reactor fuel storage arrays, extremely large quantities of fissionable materials). The
total fission yield of 1E+20 is based on historical reactor excursions with moderation, and
was originally developed in the Defense Programs Safety Survey solely for the purpose of
evaluating criticalities in spent fuel storage pools when fuel was driven together. However,
issues related to criticality and potential extreme excursions in storage environments are most
appropriately handled in the arena of criticality safety evaluations performed by criticality
safety professionals for the purpose of minimizing chances of occurrence. Design
considerations relating to these issues are not effectively driven by unrealistic dose
calculations by accident analysts. If it is necessary to consider an upper bound of
consequence, 50% of the noble gases and 5% of the radioiodine (based on fuel slump/melt
values used for moderated solids and dry solids) considered released without attempting
mechanistic modelling of base material physical effects is assessed to be adequate.
4
Table 6-10 indicates quantities of radionuclide groups released from molten ceramic oxide fuel, which will bound
this condition where minimal, if any, melting is assumed. Other non-volatile releases may be assumed in accordance with
Table 6-10, but will not typically be major contributors to airborne dose outside the facility. Historical records indicate
some surface oxidation and deformation may occur, but this should be bounded by the ARF and RF values of 3E-5 and
0.04 given for oxidation of metals at elevated temperatures in Chapter 4, and thus not be a significant release source.
Page 6-4


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