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Effects on Plant Operation cont'd |
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|  DOE-HDBK-1116-98
APPENDIX B
Nearly four hours after the fire started, four
auxiliary unit operators working in pairs were
successful in isolating faulted residual heat
removal circuits to get the residual heat
removal system aligned. The residual heat
removal system was not started until early
the next morning, 13 hours after the fire
started, because it could not be confirmed
that the system was filled with water.
Sixteen hours after the fire started,
shutdown cooling had been established,
suppression pool cooling continued, and
essential plant instrumentation had been
restored. Nearly all of these activities were
accomplished as a result of operator actions
locally.
Temporary power supplies, manual valve
operation, and use of temporary procedures
were typical conditions because of the fire
damage. The effects on Unit 2 were less
severe; however, the reactor depressurized
because of a suspected stuck-open relief
valve and some vessel level instrumentation
was lost. Unit 2 reactor was placed in
shutdown cooling about 11 hours after the
fire started.
B-9
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