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| DOE-HDBK-1132-99
process being confined should be designed to prevent or reduce the
potential for flammable or explosive conditions. Confinement enclosures
for flammable metals should be designed with self-contained fire
protection and extinguishing equipment; in some cases, inert
atmospheres may be desirable within the enclosures.
Work that could subject personnel to possible inhalation exposures
should be performed in process confinement enclosures. Gloveboxes
should be the preferred enclosure, but are not always practical.
Alternative systems may have to be considered.
To the extent practical, discrete processing steps should be performed in
individual process confinements to reduce the amount of hazardous
material that can be released by a single or local failure of the
confinement system. Process and auxiliary system differential pressure
should be maintained to inhibit back-flow of hazardous materials into
auxiliary systems.
Equipment design should include appropriate interlocks to prevent spills
and cross-contamination.
The design of process systems should minimize the production of scrap
and waste.
Geometric restrictions for nuclear criticality safety should apply to various
units of equipment for the different processes used. In addition, other
considerations, such as sufficient agitation in a process vessel to prevent
the settling of uranium material, should be considered for nuclear
criticality safety.
Leakage of enriched uranium material from processing equipment should
be prevented. Design considerations should include, but not be limited
to, the use of corrosion-resistant construction materials and features less
vulnerable to leakage (e.g., of flanged and/or welded construction).
I-72
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