Evaluation of Facility Hazards and Potential Accidents (Facility Level)

DOE-HDBK-1163-2003

4.4

Evaluation of Facility Hazards and Potential Accidents (Facility Level)

As discussed in Section 3 and shown in Figure 1, there are several opportunities for integrating

HA activities at the facility-level. In particular, activities related to the performance of PrHA and

nuclear facility safety analysis serve as the primary baseline for establishing a "safe envelope"

under which a facility can operate. These HA activities share much in common and present an

opportunity for streamlining HA activities. This practice is recognized and encouraged by DOE-

STD-3009 and DOE-HDBK-1100-96, DOE Handbook on Chemical Process Hazard Analysis,

where both are required at a particular facility. Integration can be achieved through a single set of

hazard/accident analyses and documentation, assuming DOE contractors work with local site

management during the initial planning process and agree on the approach and expectations.

More generally, there are several practices related to all facility-level HA activities that can

improve cost-effectiveness and reduce technical inconsistencies among HA efforts. The practice

addressed in Section 3.1, as related to the use of Teams, is of primary importance. Improving

communication among safety disciplines, analysts and facility/project management cannot be

overemphasized as the most important element to ensuring team performance and integration of

HA activities. Not adhering to the practice will result in duplicative efforts and possibly

inconsistent assumptions on consequences and necessary controls related to the same set of

hazards. This applies to both contractor and DOE organizations and is necessary to ensure that

goals and expected HA outcomes are commonly understood and shared among all participants.

This practice also must be extended to worker involvement.

Another important practice that improves cost effectiveness of HA activities is the standardization

and appropriate use of HA tools and techniques used at a given facility or site. HA techniques

vary in sophistication and cost of implementation, and users should ensure techniques are

appropriately selected for the condition being analyzed. For example, a Hazard and Operability

Study may be excessive for a non-complex operation such as a waste storage facility. Instead, a

qualitative technique such as a hazards checklist may be sufficient. The application of a wide

variety of HA techniques and tools translate into additional personnel training and procedures that

must be provided on their use. The Center for Chemical Process Safety provides useful

guidelines (see reference) on selecting and grading HA techniques.

It is also important to select appropriate methods and models for estimating consequences from

hazardous material releases. As encouraged by DOE G-151-1, Emergency Management Guide:

Hazards Surveys and Hazards Assessments, and similar consequence assessment models should

be used for emergency planning and response purposes, as well as safety analysis activities.

Where dispersion and consequence models are necessary, they should be appropriate for the

material being released, the physical characteristics of the site and its atmospheric dispersion

conditions. Additional recommendation on selection of consequences modeling can be found in

DOE G-151-1.

Sources of Information on Integration of Facility Accident Analysis:

DOE HDBK-1100-96, "Chemical Process Hazard Analysis"

DOE-STD-3009, "Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear

Facility Safety Analysis Reports"

Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation

Procedures, Second Edition with Worked Examples"