The Practical Implementation of Integrated Safety Management

DOE-HDBK-1163-2003

THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT

FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSIS AND

FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION

M. T. Collopy, M.S. and C. P. Christenson, P.E.

U.S. Department of Energy

825 Jadwin Ave. (A5-55)

Richland, WA 99352

Michael_t_mike_collopy@rl.gov

(509) 376-6284

Craig_p_christenson@rl.gov

(509) 376-5367

Abstract

In 1995 Mr. Joseph DiNunno of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued an approach

to describe the concept of an integrated safety management program, which incorporates hazard

and safety analysis to address a multitude of hazards affecting the public, worker, property, and

the environment. Since then the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has adopted a policy to

systematically integrate safety into management and work practices at all levels so that missions

can be completed while protecting the public, worker, and the environment.

While the DOE and its contractors possessed a variety of processes for analyzing fire hazards at a

facility, activity, and job; the outcome and assumptions of these processes have not always been

consistent for similar types of hazards within the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis.

Although the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis are driven by different DOE Orders and

requirements, these analyses should not be entirely independent and their preparation should be

integrated to ensure consistency of assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and other

controls.

Under the DOE policy to implement an integrated safety management system, identification of

hazards must be evaluated and agreed upon to ensure that the public, the workers, and the

environment are protected from adverse consequences. The DOE program and contractor

management need a uniform, up-to-date reference with which to plan, budget, and manage

nuclear programs. It is crucial that DOE understand the hazards and risks necessary to authorize

the work needed to be performed. If integrated safety management is not incorporated into the

preparation of the safety analysis and the fire hazard analysis, inconsistencies between

assumptions, consequences, design considerations, and controls may occur that affect safety.

Furthermore, confusion created by inconsistencies may occur in the DOE process to grant

authorization of the work.

In accordance with the integrated safety management system approach for having a uniform and

consistent process, a method has been suggested by the U.S. Department of Energy at Richland

and the Project Hanford Procedures when fire hazard analyses and safety analyses are required.

This process provides for a common basis approach in the development of the fire hazard analysis

and the safety analysis. This process permits the preparers of both documents to jointly

participate in the development of the hazard analysis process. This paper presents this method to

implement the integrated safety management approach in the development of the fire hazard

analysis and safety analysis that provides consistency of assumptions, consequences, design

considerations, and other controls necessary to protect workers, the public, and the environment.

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