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General Recommendations
For large DT fusion facilities the cryostat volume may be of order 10,000-30,000 m3. This volume
is a significant fraction of the internal volume of a fission reactor containment vessel and it may be
appropriate to design the fusion cryostat under the rules for metal containment structures rather than
designing it as a pressure vessel. Double bellows with a vacuum tight interspace are recommended.
CONFINEMENT
General
Confinement/HVAC systems include structures, systems, and components designed to serve as
barriers against the spread or uncontrolled release of radioactive or other hazardous materials
throughout the facility or to the environs.
The facility confinement strategy may consist of successive confinement barriers based on the hazards
present. The successive barriers are generally referred to as primary, secondary, tertiary, etc. and are
defined by the facility safety analysis. Primary confinement is often the function of the vacuum vessel,
cryostat, or system piping, but may be the function of ex-vessel structural barriers and process
enclosures such as gloveboxes, piping, tanks, and ductwork.
Secondary confinement consists of building structural elements and associated ventilation systems that
confine any potential release of hazardous materials from the primary confinement system. This
system includes the operating area boundary and the ventilation system and associated air cleaning
systems serving the operating area. Penetrations of the secondary confinement barrier are generally
provided with positive seals to prevent migration of contamination out of the secondary confinement
area.
Tertiary confinement consists of building elements and associated exhaust system of the process
facility. This is often the final barrier to release of hazardous material to the environment. Tertiary
confinement surrounds the secondary confinement with space which is controlled but not expected
to become contaminated.
Ventilation/HVAC
Ventilation systems should be designed to operate in conjunction with their associated physical
barriers to limit the release of radioactive or other hazardous material to the environment. The
ventilation system capabilities should be sufficient to allow for any intentional breaches of the
confinement system that are required during maintenance on any portion of the facility.
Leak-tightness of the confinement pressure boundary should be considered in the design. Air locks
to achieve the required leak-tightness between confinement/containment zone boundary interfaces
should be considered.
Appropriate filtration may be accomplished by multistage HEPA filtration of the exhaust or by an
equivalent filtering capability. The exhaust ventilation system must be sized to ensure adequate
inflow of air in the event of the largest credible breach of confinement.
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