Guidelines For Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

• Guidelines For Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities
• This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy
• Change Notice No. 1
• Foreword to the Revised Edition
• Foreword
• Contents
• Overview
• Definitions
• Format and Content of Criticality Safety Evaluations
• Introduction
• Methodology
• Discussion of Contingencies
• Evaluation and Results
• References
• Examples of Contingency Analyses
• Examples of Contingency Analyses cont'd
• Examples of Contingency Analyses cont'd
• Examples of Criticality Safety Evaluations
• Criticality Safety Evaluation for DistributionTrap F-1202 for Solution Transfer to D-Wng
• Introduction
• Requirements Documentation
• Controls
• Controls cont'd
• Contingencies
• Contingency 1b
• Contingency 1e
• Design Features and Administratively Controlled Limits and Requirements
• Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP)
• Contents
• Figures
• Criticality Safety Evaluation for Storage of BORAX V on CPP-603 North and Middle Basin Floor
• Description
• Description cont'd
• Figure 1. CPP 603 Fuel Storage Facility Layout
• Figure 2. North/Middle Basin Concrete Dividers
• Figure 3. Example of Monorail Hangar STR with Typical Storage Bucket
• Requirements Documentation
• Methodology
• Methodology cont'd
• Figure 4. BORAX V Superheater Fuel Assembly
• Figure 5. 4 x 4 Array of BORAX V Superheater Fuel Assemblies3.
• Figure 6. SPERT-D Fuel Element.
• Discussion of Contigencies
• Evaluation and Results
• Evaluation and Results cont'd
• Figure 7. BORAX V Superheater Fuel Subassembly
• Figure 8. Various Water Reflected BORAX V Fuel Assembly Arrays
• Evaluation and Results cont'd
• Figure 9. X-Y View of Various Water & Concrete Reflected BORAX V Assembly Arrays.
• Table 1. Reactivity as a Function of distance Between BORAX V Fuel Assemblies.
• Design Features and Administrative Limits
• References
• Appendices
• Appendices cont'd
• Appendices cont'd
• Criticality Safety Evaluation of the Device for the Imaginary Event, Pit Shipment and Nevada Test Site Handling
• Introduction
• Evaluation and Results
• Summary and Conclusions
• Contents
• Figures
• Criticality Safety Evaluation for Shipment of Radioactive Waste within the Boundaries of the INEL
• Requirements Documentation
• Methodology
• Table 1. Results of ANISN benchmark calculations with Hansen-Roach 16-energy-group cross section data
• Discussion of Contingencies
• Evaluation and Results
• Evaluation and Results cont'd
• Table 3. Results of ANISN calculations for spheres of Pu-239 reflected
• Figure 1. Calculated k-effective versus H/Pu-239 ratio
• Figure 2. Maximum calculated k-effective versus Pu-239 mass for polyethylene
• Design Features (Passive and Active) and Administratively Controlled Limits and Requirements
• Summary and Conclusions
• References
• Appendix A Materials and Compositions
• Table A-1. Summary of materials and compositions.
• Appendix B Typical ANISN/PC Input Listings
• Listing 1. ANISN input listing for Case 2 of Table 3; H/Pu 900
• Listing 1. Continued
• Listing 1. Continued.
• Listing 2. ANISN input listing for Benchmark PNL-7
• Listing 2. Continued
• Listing 2. Continued
• Listing 2. Continued
• Building 371 Caustic Waste Treatment System
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Requirements Documentation
• Shielded Annular Tanks
• Evaluation Results
• Neutron Absorber Sandwich
• Evaluation Results cont'd
• Evaluation Results cont'd
• Evaluation Results cont'd
• Evaluation Results cont'd
• Evaluation Results cont'd
• Figure 2 GB2404 Filter
• Transfer of waste liquid to Building 374
• Direct draining of Building 371 tanks to tanks D-2401 A/B/C/D
• Design Features and Administratively Controlled Limits and Requirements
• Administrative Controls (Procedural)
• Summary and Conclusions
• References
• Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Port Inserts
• Materials to be Dissolved
• Table 1. Materials to be Dissolved (Based on Ref. 15)
• Dissolution Process
• Requirements Documentation
• Table 5 Summary of Criticality Safety Envelope for dissolution
• Discussion of Contingencies cont'd
• Second Defense
• Analysis for No Uranium in Solution
• Analysis for No Uranium in Solution cont'd
• Analysis With Uranium in Solution
• Analysis With Uranium in Solution cont'd
• Conservative Assumptions
• Design Features (Passive and Active) and Administratively Controlled Limits & Requirements
• Summary and Conclusions
• References
• References cont'd
• Figure 1. Annular Dissolver Tank 6.1 or 6.4 (Drawing S5-2-136710)
• Figure 2. Top View of Annular Dissolver With Port Spacing
• Figure 3. Mark-42 Insert With "TRR" Insert (6 Well Insert)
• Figure 4. Three Well Insert
• Figure 5. Critically Safe Concentrations for Lattices of Uranium Metal in Water
• Figure 6. Critical Mass of U-235 for a Sphere
• Concluding Material
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Guidelines For Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

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