Contingency 1e

DOE-STD-3007-93

A reasonable level of operational control is present to avoid routine transfer of solution to

the final Special Process area trap in the northwest area of Room 1022.

Significant solution bypass of the final trap would require gross system misoperation for

the transfer efforts to F-1202, coupled with either alarm failure or lack of personnel response to

the alarm. In the Headhouse, the final wet vacuum equipment provides a significant safe

geometry surge volume (multiple 6-inch diameter steel traps in parallel), as discussed in CSA HH-

123, followed by two alarmed 6-inch glass traps in series. Upon liquid detection by these final

alarms, automatic block valves in the main vacuum header close to prevent fissile solution transfer

to the jet vacuum producers. This alarm system and interlocked block valve is formally

designated as a safety system. The surge volume plus safety system serve to positively preclude

loss of geometry control fissile solution, by preventing loss of fissile material to the storm sewer

drain system.

Contingency 1e

Use of an improper container for drainage of solution from F-1202 is precluded by

operator training and supervisory oversight.

A situation whereby an operator intentionally transfers fissile solution from F-1202 into a

large geometry container is precluded by the strict nature of operator training and supervisory

oversight for this process area. Operator training emphasizes the immediate danger of such

action. Such an event would be expected only as the result of either sabotage or suicidal action,

which are outside the bounds of the analysis.

6.0 RESULTS

The distribution trap is approved for use as described.

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