Restricted Approach Boundary

DOE-HDBK-XXXX-2005

06/30/2005

534.

RESTRICTED APPROACH BOUNDARY. An approach limit at a distance from an

exposed live part within which there is an increased risk of shock, due to electrical arc

over combined with inadvertent movement, for personnel working in close proximity to

the live part. [NFPA 70E]

535.

RISK. The quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that considers both the

probability that a hazard will cause harm and the consequences of that event. [DOE O

5480.30]

536.

RISK-INFORMED. Using knowledge of the risk. [DOE G 450.4-1B]

537.

ROOT CAUSE. The determination of the causal factors preceding structures, systems,

and components (SSC) failure or malfunction - that is, discovery of the principal reason

why the failure or malfunction happened leads to the identification of the root cause. The

preceding failure or malfunction causal factors are always events or conditions that are

necessary and sufficient to produce or contribute to the unwanted results (failure or

malfunction). The types of causal factors are: (1) direct causes, (2) contributing causes,

and (3) root causes. The direct cause is the immediate event or condition that caused the

failure or malfunction. Contributing causes are conditions or events that collectively

increase the likelihood of the failure or malfunction, but that individually do not cause

them. Thus, root causes are events or conditions that, if corrected or eliminated, would

prevent the recurrence of the failure or malfunction by identifying and correcting faults

(often hidden) before an SSC fails or malfunctions. [DOE G 433.1-1]

538.

ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS. Any methodology that identifies the causal factors that, if

corrected, would prevent recurrence of the accident. [DOE G 225.1A-1]

539.

ROUTINE OPERATION. Routine operation of an accelerator commences at that point

where DOE authorization has been granted either (1) because the commissioning effort is

sufficiently complete to provide confidence that the risks are both understood and

acceptable and the operation has appropriate safety bounds, or (2) to permit the re-

introduction of a particle beam after being directed to cease operation by DOE because of

an environmental, safety, or health concern. [DOE 0 5480.25 cancelled, DRAFT DOE

G 420.2-X]

SAFETY ANALYSIS. A documented process:

540.

A. to provide systematic identification of hazards within a given DOE operation;

B. to describe and analyze the adequacy of the measures taken to eliminate, control, or

mitigate identified hazards; and

DRAFT